MUTED VOICES: TOWARD AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE U.S. ASYLUM PROGRAM AT THE SOUTHWEST BORDER by Chen, Jaime
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
DSpace Repository
Theses and Dissertations 1. Thesis and Dissertation Collection, all items
2020-12
MUTED VOICES: TOWARD AN
UNDERSTANDING OF THE U.S. ASYLUM
PROGRAM AT THE SOUTHWEST BORDER
Chen, Jaime
Monterey, CA; Naval Postgraduate School
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/66611
Copyright is reserved by the copyright owner.








MUTED VOICES: TOWARD AN UNDERSTANDING 
OF THE U.S. ASYLUM PROGRAM 




Co-Advisors: Cristiana Matei 
 Carolyn C. Halladay 
 
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE  Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 
 Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing 
instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of 
information.  Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including 
suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 
Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction 
Project (0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503. 
 1. AGENCY USE ONLY 
(Leave blank)  
2. REPORT DATE 
 December 2020  
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
 Master's thesis 
 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 
MUTED VOICES: TOWARD AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE U.S. ASYLUM 
PROGRAM AT THE SOUTHWEST BORDER 
 5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
 
  
 6. AUTHOR(S) Jaime Chen 
 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943-5000 
 8. PERFORMING 
ORGANIZATION REPORT 
NUMBER 
 9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND 
ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
 10. SPONSORING / 
MONITORING AGENCY 
REPORT NUMBER 
 11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the 
official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 
 12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.  
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
 A 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)     
 The often-dismissed people who live, work, and pass through the Mexico-U.S. border can offer new 
insight into the U.S. asylum program crisis. This thesis develops a concept called muted voices that can help 
identify, access, and hear the subjective stories of displaced people, border patrol agents, and U.S. 
Citizenship and Immigration Services officers. These individuals go through a similar journey of trauma and 
stress in their interactions with U.S. bureaucratic systems—systems made even more cumbersome by 
executive orders and procedural changes from a presidential administration hell-bent on restricting the U.S. 
asylum program. The fictional narratives and historical background presented in this thesis illuminate the 
everyday realities, struggles, and complexities along the border as well as the geopolitical, historical, and 
economic conditions that have culminated in the current crisis. The accounts of a displaced youth fleeing his 
home, a border patrol agent implementing the praxis of bordering, ordering, and othering, and a refugee 
officer interpreting asylum procedures reveal how policies shape lives and help to situate implications and 
recommendations for homeland security. 
 14. SUBJECT TERMS 
muted voices, Southwest Border, Mexico-U.S., crisis, asylum program, migration, migrants, 
displaced people, refugees, asylum seekers, border patrol agents, asylum officers, 
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), credible fear, reasonable fear, Honduras, 
Citizenship and Immigration Services, Customs and Border Patrol, radical subjectivity, 
fictional narratives, bordering, ordering, othering, Department of Homeland Security, 
humanitarian, ethics, deterrence, detention, Trump administration 
 15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES 
 159 
 16. PRICE CODE 




 18. SECURITY 
CLASSIFICATION OF THIS 
PAGE 
Unclassified 








NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89) 
Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 
i 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
ii 
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. 
MUTED VOICES: TOWARD AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE U.S. ASYLUM 
PROGRAM AT THE SOUTHWEST BORDER 
Jaime Chen 
Immigration Services Officer, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, 
Department of Homeland Security 
BA, Wesleyan University, 2001 
MA, Brandeis University, 2010 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES  
(HOMELAND SECURITY AND DEFENSE) 
from the 
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
December 2020 
Approved by: Cristiana Matei 
 Co-Advisor 
 Carolyn C. Halladay 
 Co-Advisor 
 Erik J. Dahl 
 Associate Professor, Department of National Security Affairs 
iii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
iv 
ABSTRACT 
 The often-dismissed people who live, work, and pass through the Mexico–U.S. 
border can offer new insight into the U.S. asylum program crisis. This thesis develops a 
concept called muted voices that can help identify, access, and hear the subjective stories 
of displaced people, border patrol agents, and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 
officers. These individuals go through a similar journey of trauma and stress in their 
interactions with U.S. bureaucratic systems—systems made even more cumbersome by 
executive orders and procedural changes from a presidential administration hell-bent on 
restricting the U.S. asylum program. The fictional narratives and historical background 
presented in this thesis illuminate the everyday realities, struggles, and complexities 
along the border as well as the geopolitical, historical, and economic conditions that have 
culminated in the current crisis. The accounts of a displaced youth fleeing his home, a 
border patrol agent implementing the praxis of bordering, ordering, and othering, and a 
refugee officer interpreting asylum procedures reveal how policies shape lives and help to 
situate implications and recommendations for homeland security. 
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The U.S. asylum program at the Southwest border is the locale of a dynamic, 
contentious crisis. The number of asylum seekers at the Mexico-U.S. border began to soar 
in 2014 as families fled from violence and poverty in the Northern Triangle of Central 
America (El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras).1 The asylum screening backlog grew 
by more than 777 percent, from 9,000 in fiscal year 2010 to 79,000 in 2017.2 This crisis is 
compounded by mounting affirmative asylum cases at the U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Services (USCIS) and removal cases awaiting hearings in the U.S. 
immigration court system. Mainstream media and some politicians, especially forty-fifth 
U.S. President Donald Trump, drew attention to the surge at the border, cultivating a 
narrative of a “crisis,” characterized by migrants who were seeking to exploit “loopholes” 
in the asylum program so they could stay in America.3 Meanwhile, critics argued that the 
real crisis was a humanitarian one, exacerbated by the Trump administration’s efforts to 
keep asylum seekers from their legal right to protection.4  
When the Trump administration took office in January 2017, it responded to the 
Southwest border crisis with policy, procedural, and programmatic changes—including 
zero tolerance and family separation policies, along with Migrant Protection Protocols—
                                                 
1 Scott Latta, “Central American Migration Facts,” Mercy Corps, May 1, 2019, 
https://www.mercycorps.org/articles/quick-facts-central-american-migration. 
2 Doris Meissner, Faye Hipsman, and T. Alexander Aleinikoff, The U.S. Asylum System in Crisis: 
Charting a Way Forward (Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2018), 11, 
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/us-asylum-system-crisis-charting-way-forward. 
3 See Donald J. Trump, “The Democrats should change the Loopholes and Asylum Laws so lives will 
be saved at our Southern Border…,” Twitter, June 2, 2019, https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/
1143948712684576768?lang=en; Mica Rosenberg and Kristina Cooke, “Exclusive: New Training 
Document for Asylum Screenings Reflects Tougher U.S. Stance,” Reuters, May 4, 2019, 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-immigration-asylum-exclusive/exclusive-new-training-document-
for-asylum-screenings-reflects-tougher-u-s-stance-idUSKCN1SA0LG. 
4 Alan Bersin, Nate Bruggeman, and Ben Rohrbaugh, “Yes, There’s a Crisis on the Border. And It’s 
Trump’s Fault.,” POLITICO, April 5, 2019, https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2019/04/05/border-
crisis-donald-trump-226573. 
xiv 
which aim to deter asylum seekers from crossing the border.5 Although these changes have 
reduced the number of migrants entering the United States, they have also added layers of 
bureaucracy that have handicapped the asylum program, overwhelmed staff, and inflicted 
cruelty on the migrants.6 News from the Southwest border became increasingly alarming: 
separation of children, overcrowded facilities, deaths of migrants, staff suicides, and open 
rebellion among staff and detainees.7 The U.S. asylum program’s overall quality and 
integrity began to diminish as its mission and objectives grew murkier, making the program 
more vulnerable to national security threats.  
The asylum program at the Mexico-U.S. border is a complex ecosystem, diverse in 
processes and procedures, and in the people who live, work, and pass through it. Behind 
the headlines is a transient community of displaced people, border patrol agents, and 
USCIS officers who populate the U.S. asylum ecosystem; they intermingle, interact, and 
collide with each other and the natural and human-made structures and systems. While 
much of the inquiry into immigration and border security has focused on the programs, 
processes, and procedures, this research emphasizes the people. Their accounts of 
traversing through the asylum program, encountering and processing irregular entries, and 
interpreting procedures reveal how policies shape lives, and their voices offer a richer 
understanding of the homeland security issues at the border during this “crisis” period.8 To 
identify, access, and hear the voices of these people, this thesis develops a concept it calls 
muted voices. 
                                                 
5 Sarah Pierce and Jessica Bolter, Dismantling and Reconstructing the U.S. Immigration System: A 
Catalog of Changes under the Trump Presidency (Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2020), 
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/us-immigration-system-changes-trump-presidency. 
6 Office of U.S. Senator Jeff Merkley, “Shattered Refuge: A U.S. Senate Investigation into the Trump 




7 Office of U.S. Senator Jeff Merkley. 
8 The specific period covered in this thesis spans from 2016 to 2019.  
xv 
The thesis has three main chapters—bookended by an introductory chapter and a 
conclusion—which contain fictional narratives and historical background. The narratives 
follow a displaced Honduran youth seeking asylum at the Mexico-U.S. border, the U.S. 
Border Patrol agent he encounters, and the refugee officer who screens him for credible 
fear.9 The background contextualizes these three individuals’ experiences and their 
interactions within history, society, and policies. By interweaving historical context and 
fictional perspectives based on facts and lived experiences, this thesis adds flesh and bones 
to the impact of policies and the daily choices individuals must make. The narratives and 
analysis present a holistic understanding of the border ecosystem and illuminate the 
everyday realities, struggles, and complexities of interactions at the border. 
While the crisis at the border has no single, easy solution, this research produced 
some novel approaches to tackling the broader issues. For instance, the concept of muted 
voices—radical subjectivity—can challenge irrational populist notions and the mainstream 
media’s portrayal of immigrants. The way this thesis shares their stories alongside each 
other highlights the humanity in the crisis and breaks down the notion of the other, offering 
an ethical approach to the problems of polarization and the us-versus-them heuristics. The 
circumstances that push distressed individuals and families to flee to the United States are 
complex; because policy-makers have failed to decipher how migration functions, its 
evolving nature and changing patterns, its drivers, and how it builds on the past, the United 
States has misidentified points of intervention and missed opportunities for adaptation and 
mitigation. Thus, this thesis recommends that the United States must, initially, confront its 
past interventions and the unintended consequences of its domestic and foreign policies—
a regional truth and reconciliation—to achieve true migration collaboration with the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Northern Triangle of Central America, and 
Mexico. The United States must also rein in its border enforcement praxis of “bordering, 
                                                 
9 Individuals in the expedited removal process, who are seeking asylum, must establish that they have 
a credible fear of persecution or torture to have a hearing in front of a judge in immigration court.  
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ordering, and othering” and refine the role of border patrol agents.10 Customs and Border 
Protection needs to confront the consequences of its practices, primarily the distancing that 
has produced and cultivated racist and xenophobic views and the emotional anguish that 
contributed to more than one hundred suicides among its staff in just twelve years.11  
The research also recommends concrete steps the United States can immediately 
take to restore the asylum program to its efficient, effective, fair, and humane state. The 
United States must roll back the unreasonable and often cruel barriers used to deter asylum 
seekers from obtaining protection; it must cease relentlessly dialing up the level of 
bureaucracy and cruelty. The asylum program would also benefit from restoring the 
credible fear screening to its original intent: a quick assessment of admission into the 
asylum process. A related recommendation is to refer positive credible fear cases to the 
Asylum Division for affirmative adjudication. Finally, this thesis advocates for the 
reestablishment of the Central American Minors program for children with families in the 
United States. If policy-makers can reduce the number of asylum seekers at the Mexico-
U.S. border, they can relieve the burden and stress on the Border Patrol and the U.S. asylum 
system. The interventions described in this thesis would allow USCIS to control the flow 
of migrants and ensure the United States operates judiciously within national and 
international laws. Ultimately, these interventions would remove the conditions that 
created many of the challenges plaguing the transient community that lives, works at, and 
crosses the border.  
 
                                                 
10 Henk van Houtum and Ton van Naerssen, “Bordering, Ordering and Othering,” Tijdschrift Voor 
Economische En Sociale Geografie 93, no. 2 (May 2002): 125–36, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-
9663.00189. 
11 “CBP Employee Suicide Report: Data from 2007–Present,” U.S. Customs and Border Protection, 
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For most of its history, the U.S. asylum program efficiently adjudicated thousands 
of cases according to U.S. law and international standards. Starting in the early 2010s, 
however, a spike in affirmative filings resulted in a backlog in the U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Services (USCIS) Asylum Division.1 According to the Migration Policy 
Institute, the affirmative asylum requests totaled 28,000 in fiscal year (FY) 2010; by FY 
2017, the number of applications reached 143,000, an increase of more than 410 percent.2 
And as of June 2018, the USCIS Asylum Division had 320,000 claims pending 
adjudication. 
The number of irregular entries at the Mexico-U.S. border also began to soar in the 
2010s as families fled from violence and poverty in the Northern Triangle of Central 
America (NTCA)—the countries of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.3 The asylum 
screening backlog for the same period—FY 2010 to FY 2017—grew by more than 
777 percent, from 9,000 to 79,000.4 To compound the problem, removal cases in the 
immigration court system, known as the Executive Office for Immigration Review, 
quadrupled between FY 2010 and 2019, reaching over a million cases.5 U.S. politicians 
and media directed attention to the surge of asylum seekers at the border, cultivating a 
                                                 
1 Under USCIS, Refugee, Asylum, and International Operations (RAIO) handles all humanitarian 
immigration programs. The Asylum Division within RAIO specifically deals with asylum adjudications 
and pre-screenings. 
2 Doris Meissner, Faye Hipsman, and T. Alexander Aleinikoff, The U.S. Asylum System in Crisis: 
Charting a Way Forward (Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2018), 2, 
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/us-asylum-system-crisis-charting-way-forward.  
3 Latta, “Central American Migration Facts.” 
4 Meissner, Hipsman, and Aleinikoff, The U.S. Asylum System in Crisis, 11. 
5 Marissa Esthimer, “Crisis in the Courts: Is the Backlogged U.S. Immigration Court System at its 
Breaking Point?” Migration Policy Institute, October 1, 2019, https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/
backlogged-us-immigration-courts-breaking-point. 
2 
narrative of a migrant “crisis” and “loopholes” in the asylum program.6 In doing so, they 
disregarded the asylum system’s inefficiencies and manufactured a crisis to validate their 
anti-immigrant, nativist agenda.7 In the process, they corroded the asylum program. 
The spotlight on the increased caseload was a political opportunity. During the 2016 
presidential election, immigration became a major topic and the subject of polarizing and 
racially charged sound bites.8 Nearly every day, mainstream media reported stories: 
terrorists hiding among Central American asylum seekers heading toward the United 
States; abuse of migrants by the U.S. Border Patrol; and a U.S. asylum program full of 
loopholes. When Donald Trump moved into the White House in January 2017, his 
administration enacted policy and procedural changes to U.S. humanitarian programs, 
including programs affecting asylum at the border. Although these changes have reduced 
the number of migrants entering the United States, they have also created processes and 
procedures that have handicapped the asylum program. Meanwhile, the backlogs continue 
and the U.S. asylum program’s overall quality diminishes as its mission and objectives 
grow murkier, making the program more vulnerable to national security threats. News 
coming from the Southwest border has become increasingly alarming—children separated 
from their parents, overcrowded facilities, food and hygiene supply shortages, sick and 
dying migrants, staff turnovers, suicides, and open rebellion among staff and detainees. 
                                                 
6 See Donald J. Trump, “The Democrats should change the Loopholes and Asylum Laws so lives will 
be saved at our Southern Border…,” Twitter, June 2, 2019, https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/
1143948712684576768?lang=en; Mica Rosenberg and Kristina Cooke, “Exclusive: New Training 
Document for Asylum Screenings Reflects Tougher U.S. Stance,” Reuters, May 4, 2019, 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-immigration-asylum-exclusive/exclusive-new-training-document-
for-asylum-screenings-reflects-tougher-u-s-stance-idUSKCN1SA0LG. 
7 Alan Bersin, Nate Bruggeman, and Ben Rohrbaugh, “Yes, There’s a Crisis on the Border. And It’s 
Trump’s Fault.,” POLITICO, April 5, 2019, https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2019/04/05/border-
crisis-donald-trump-226573.  
8 As a candidate for president, Trump called Mexican immigrants “rapists” who are “bringing crime” 
and “bringing drugs” to the United States. The racist and dehumanizing language used to discuss 
immigrants, refugees, and asylum-seekers continued into his presidency. There are claims that Trump said 
immigrants from Haiti “all have AIDS,” and people from Nigeria would never “go back to their huts” upon 
arrival in the United States. He called Haiti, El Salvador, and parts of Africa “shithole countries.” Natasha 
Arnpriester, “Trumping Asylum: Criminal Prosecutions for ‘Illegal’ Entry and Reentry Violate the Rights 
of Asylum Seekers,” Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly 45, no. 1 (2017): 3–46. 
3 
The asylum program at the Mexico-U.S. border is a complex environment, diverse 
in processes and procedures and in the people who live, work, and pass through it. Behind 
the headlines is a transient community of displaced people and migrants, border patrol 
agents, and USCIS officers who populate the U.S. asylum ecosystem; they intermingle, 
interact, and collide with each other and the natural and human-made structures and 
systems. While much of the inquiry into immigration and border security has focused on 
the programs, processes, and procedures, this research emphasizes the people. Their 
accounts of traversing through the asylum program, encountering and processing irregular 
entries, and interpreting procedures reveal how policies shape lives, and their voices offer 
a richer understanding of the homeland security issues at the border during this “crisis.”9  
This thesis does not define homeland security in the narrow, simple sense of 
preventing terrorism or terrorists from crossing the U.S. border. It relates, instead, to the 
term meta hazard, which Christopher Bellavita of the Naval Postgraduate School defines 
as “a national effort to prevent or mitigate any social trend or threat that can disrupt the 
long-term stability of the American way of life.”10 This understanding reflects the idea that 
the U.S. asylum ecosystem is complex, even chaotic, and the thinking about homeland 
security expands beyond preventing terrorism. This interpretation of homeland security, as 
a field, acknowledges the diverse people, perspectives, and disciplines involved.  
This thesis uses mixed qualitative methods—fictional perspectives and historical 
background—to provide a distinct portrait of the complex problems at the Southwest 
border. The fictional perspectives are based on a concept, developed in this thesis, called 
muted voices; it is used to identify, access, and hear the subjective stories of the transient 
border community. The narrative follows a displaced Honduran youth seeking asylum at 
the Mexico-U.S. border, the U.S. border patrol agent he encounters, and the refugee officer 
who screens him for credible fear.11 The background contextualizes these three 
                                                 
9 The specific period covered in this thesis spans from 2016 to 2019.  
10 Christopher Bellavita, “What Is Homeland Security?” Homeland Security Affairs 4, no. 1 (June 
2008): 2, https://www.hsaj.org/articles/118. 
11 Individuals in the expedited removal process, who are seeking asylum, must establish that they have 
a credible fear of persecution or torture to have a hearing in front of a judge in immigration court.  
4 
individuals’ experiences and their interactions within history, society, and policies. 
Together, the narratives and background unpack some of the drivers of migration, the 
conflicts within border enforcement and security, and the malady that afflicts the U.S. 
asylum program. They present a holistic understanding of the border ecosystem and 
illuminate the everyday realities, struggles, and complexities of the interactions at the 
border.  
This study focuses on the following research question: How can hearing muted 
voices expand the understanding of the U.S. asylum program and protect the United States 
from threats to the American way of life?  
A. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This review traces approaches for understanding voluntary and forced migration—
the distinction between the two is a key point of contention in the making of the so-called 
migrant crisis at the Mexico-U.S. border. Although migration is not binary, the literature 
shows that scholars often take either an economic or sociological approach; additionally, 
this outlook does not account for the subjectivity of migrants, displaced people, and other 
members of the border ecosystem.  
A vast literature on population movement from different perspectives and 
disciplines attempts to define migration’s nature and pattern and identify the determinants 
that compel a group of people to migrate. The first academics to explain migration patterns 
within and between nations were geographers.12 Ernest George Ravenstein—writing in 
1885, at the height of the Industrial Revolution, when millions of people left their homes 
in search of a better life—established the first “laws of migration.”13 Studying British 
census data, he observed a pattern of human movement from agrarian to industrial societies 
                                                 
12 Djelti Samir, “The Evolution of the Human Migration Determinants 1,” paper presented at the 
international conference, 2017, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/
320427737_The_Evolution_of_the_Human_Migration_Determinants_1_Draft_paper. 
13 John Corbett, “Ernest George Ravenstein: The Laws of Migration, 1885,” in CSISS Classics, ed. 
Janelle Donald (Santa Barbara, CA: Center for Spatially Integrated Social Science, 2003): 3, 
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/3018p230.  
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that he attributed to economic aspiration.14 Ravenstein’s study falls under the umbrella of 
the theory of spatial interaction, that is, the exchange of goods, ideas, and people from one 
location to another.15 Ravenstein’s laws sparked many studies of migration determinants—
distance, population, industrialization, labor market, and sex, among others.  
Other geographers, for example, A. G. Wilson, expanded on the theory of spatial 
interaction initially with the gravity model, which posits that migration is positively 
correlated with large population size and negatively correlated with distance between 
origin and destination. By 1967, Wilson shifted to a more complex understanding of the 
spatial interplays among regions. In 1981, he highlighted distance, population, social 
modernization, and the environment as migration’s leading drivers.16 His shift 
demonstrates the widening of the field and recognizes the study’s interplay among multiple 
academic disciplines.  
Although many scholars already separated migration determinants into push and 
pull factors, sociologist Everett Spurgeon Lee first coined the terms and elaborated on these 
factors. In his “A Theory of Migration,” Lee contends that origin and destination countries 
have negative and positive factors, both economic and non-economic, that “push” and 
“pull” people to migrate; these factors determine migration volume.17 He explains that 
additional “intervening obstacles,” including distance from the origin to destination, and 
the feasibility of transportation, as well as personal circumstances, influence one’s decision 
to migrate.18 Lee’s work continues to be widely used to explain migration today.  
A free market perspective dominates most scholarship on migration to the exclusion 
of other viewpoints. Most empirical research on migration takes a neoclassical market 
                                                 
14 Ernest George Ravenstein, “The Laws of Migration,” Journal of the Statistical Society of London 
48, no. 2 (June 1885): 167–235. 
15 “Spatial Interaction,” Geography, accessed February 24, 2020, https://geography.name/spatial-
interaction/. 
16 A. G. Wilson, “A Family of Spatial Interaction Models, and Associated Development,” 
Environment and Planning 3, no. 1 (March 1971): 1–32. 
17 Evette S. Lee, “A Theory of Migration,” Demography 3, no. 1 (1966): 47–57. 
18 Lee, 50. 
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perspective that assumes population movements represent the collective, voluntary 
undertakings of male individuals and their rational assessment of economic advantages and 
disadvantages.19 For example, Larry Sjaastad attempts to untangle migration decisions 
through a human capital lens. He develops a model to study the effects of per capita income, 
rate of income growth, and educational level on migration, and finds a direct correlation 
between the promise of higher income and in-migration.20 He characterizes migration as 
“an investment increasing the productivity of human resources, an investment which has 
costs which also renders returns.”21 His model is widely used and is the basis of many 
inquiries in the migration studies landscape. Another influential work among the plethora 
of neoclassical research studies on migration is from John Harris and Michael Todaro. 
They argue that the economic development of a particular location and the availability of 
jobs and higher wages primarily determine a migrant’s decision to leave.22 This 
scholarship on migration reflects and influences mainstream assumptions about the nature 
of population movement and shapes immigration law and policies in destination countries.  
In contrast, sociologist P. Neal Richey offers a more nuanced economic perspective 
on migration. Focusing on international migration from developing to developed countries, 
Richey observes that migrants who are less educated and have lower earning potential tend 
to favor shorter-distance migration. He attributes this pattern to the practical advantage of 
lower transportation costs and accessible information about nearby places.23 In their study, 
Oded Stark and David E. Bloom offer a perspective of decision-making at the household 
level; they note that the household decides who would migrate based on physical and 
                                                 
19 “Understanding Migration,” Striking Women, accessed March 2, 2020, https://www.striking-
women.org/module/migration/understanding-migration. 
20 Larry A. Sjaastad, “The Costs and Returns of Human Migration,” Journal of Political Economy 70, 
no. 5 (October 1962): 80–93. 
21 Sjaastad, 83. 
22 John R. Harris and Michael P. Todaro, “Migration, Unemployment and Development: A Two-
Sector Analysis,” American Economic Review 60, no. 1 (1970): 126–42. 
23 P. Neal Ritchey, “Explanations of Migration,” Annual Review of Sociology 2 (August 1976): 363–
404. 
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mental endurance as well as capacity to send remittances.24 Although these studies 
expanded the neoclassical view on migration, they continued to perceive migration as a 
mostly voluntary decision based on a rational assessment of costs and benefits.25  
Despite numerous historical examples of forced migration, the first exploration of 
the concept of refugees did not occur until the 1920s, when scholars took note of mass 
movements during World War I.26 Some of these early studies exhibit wide divergence, 
even in scholars’ understanding of the basic terminology. Not until 1951 did a rather strict 
definition of refugee set the perimeters of the field’s scope. The 1951 Convention Relating 
to the Status of Refugees defines a refugee as “someone who is unable or unwilling to 
return to their country of origin owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for 
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political 
opinion.”27 However, scholars continued to argue over terminology. In an essay in the 
journal Demography, Alden Speare interprets forced migration narrowly as the physical, 
involuntary, coerced transport of people from their origin country to their destination.28 
His definition implicitly assumes that there must be an anthropogenic presence of violence 
and threat of violence. In contrast, Johan Galtung defines forced migration as any violation 
of human rights to life, liberty, and the basic needs for survival. In this definition, almost 
every form of migration can fall into the category of “forced.”29 Most literature on 
population movement builds on the underlying assumption that migration is either forced 
or voluntary. However, Anthony Richmond explains that migration’s complexity makes it 
                                                 
24 Oded Stark and David E. Bloom, “The New Economics of Labor Migration,” The American 
Economic Review 75, no. 2 (May 1985): 173–78. 
25 Striking Women, “Understanding Migration.” 
26 L. W. Holborn, “The League of Nations and the Refugee Problem,” Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science 203 (1939): 124–35. 
27 “The 1951 Refugee Convention,” UNHCR, accessed January 10, 2020, https://www.unhcr.org/en-
us/3b66c2aa10. 
28 Alden Speare Jr., “Residential Satisfaction as an Intervening Variable in Residential Mobility,” 
Demography 11, no. 2 (May 1974): 173–88. 
29 Johan Galtung, “Violence, Peace, and Peace Research,” Journal of Peace Research 6, no. 3 (1969): 
167–91. 
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almost impossible to delineate between voluntary and forced emigration and argues that 
most decisions to migrate are complex and determined by a combination of factors.30 The 
reality defies the human tendency to narrow concepts down to an exact definition.  
Research on forced migration dramatically increased in the 1980s, paralleling the 
phenomenon itself. In many respects, the increased volume and diversification of origin 
countries and migrants, as well as changes in immigration laws and policies and the 
introduction of new processes and procedures regarding refugees, became topics for study. 
Consequently, scholarship shifted to a more historical-structural understanding of the 
population movement phenomenon.31 Many scholars attribute the expanded flow and 
complexity of migration to globalization, innovation in technology, and better 
communication. Charlotte Williams and Mekada Graham explain that a significant 
imbalance of power and wealth in the world, coupled with the reduced cost of 
transportation, better information regarding destination countries, and more robust migrant 
networks, fueled this rise.32 John Edward Taylor makes a strong case that social networks 
available at destination countries are primary pull factors. He gives weight to the draw of 
familial and social ties, associations, affinity, and the existence of a migrant community.33 
Toward the end of the twentieth century, sociologists like Steven Vertovec developed the 
theory of transnational spaces to explain the links among individuals, groups, and 
institutions and how they propel waves of migrations.34 In these ways, scholars pursued 
different explanations for migration drivers, whether from history, globalization factors, 
cultural and familial “pull” factors, or others. 
                                                 
30 Anthony H. Richmond, “Sociological Theories of International Migration: The Case of Refugees,” 
Current Sociology 36, no. 2 (June 1988): 7–25. 
31 Striking Women, “Understanding Migration.” 
32 Charlotte Williams and Mekada Graham, “‘A World on the Move’: Migration, Mobilities and 
Social Work,” British Journal of Social Work 44, no. 1 (June 2014): i1–17. 
33 John Edward Taylor, Differential Migration, Networks, Information and Risk (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University, 1984). 
34 Steven Vertovec, “Conceiving and Researching Transnationalism,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 22, 
no. 2 (1999): 447. 
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Most destination countries react to migration with tighter control and more 
restrictions at borders. Henk van Houtum and Ton van Naerssen later identified this 
practice as “bordering, ordering, and othering.”35 Writing after September 11, 2001, the 
authors warn of the prevailing negative sentiment toward migration as a national security 
risk.36 Wilfred Ethier echoes the reasoning of destination countries, explaining that 
deterrents, including border interdictions and internal enforcement, will reduce risks to the 
homeland from mass immigration.37 In the 1990s, Douglas Massey observed that 
migration is an ever-evolving, complicated exchange that alters the social, economic, and 
cultural landscape of both origin and destination countries. Similar to John Edward Taylor, 
Massey also argues that the strength of migrant networks can overcome restrictive 
immigration policies, a weak economy, and other factors that pull a migrant to relocate.38 
Williams and Graham, too, posit that this movement of people results in social 
transformations in both origin and destination countries and generates questions about 
identity, nationhood, citizenship, and community. They conclude that these 
transformations challenge established literature and change the conceptualization of 
migration as “movement,” given the immense possibilities in terms of scale and diversity 
made available by “communication technologies, transportation, and culture.”39 Despite 
the impetus to restrict migration, these scholars seem to concur that migration’s ever-
evolving nature means that migrants will adapt and innovate to overcome barriers.  
Whereas most academics conflate voluntary migration with the choice to seek 
economic advancement, the push factors of forced migration represent a broad spectrum 
ranging from combinations of political and social instability, war and violent conflict, 
                                                 
35 Henk van Houtum and Ton van Naerssen, “Bordering, Ordering and Othering,” Tijdschrift Voor 
Economische En Sociale Geografie 93, no. 2 (May 2002): 125–36, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-
9663.00189. 
36 van Houtum and van Naerssen, 127. 
37 Wilfred Ethier, “Illegal Immigration: The Host-Country Problem,” American Economic Review 76, 
no. 1 (March 1986): 56–71. 
38 Douglas S. Massey, “The Social and Economic Origins of Immigration,” Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Sciences 510, no. 1 (July 1990): 60–72. 
39 Williams and Graham, “A World on the Move,” i1. 
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persecution, intolerance, violation of rights, poverty, and unemployment. Holly E. Reed, 
Bernadette Ludwig, and Laura Braslow discuss these crucial factors and how they 
produced such labels as “refugee,” “displaced,” and “stateless.”40 van Houtum and van 
Naerssen argue that these differences, especially in terms of migrants and refugees, are 
“arbitrary and abstract” because “it is extremely difficult to trace and categorise the many 
and different motivations and apparent needs for people to migrate.”41 Roger Zetter 
contends that what one assumed as “voluntary” may be structural inequalities and 
poverty—the insidious effects of years of exclusion and exploitation of minorities group.42 
He argues that these “muted conditions” force groups to seek better circumstances 
elsewhere.43 Finally, Zetter postulates that distinguishing between “refugee” and 
“migrant” is bureaucratic and reflects the institutional need to manage migration flows 
rather than reality.44 In other words, destination countries’ tendency to apply a strict label 
of “migrant” with its implicit association to individual economic choice serves the need of 
policies, program design, and implementation for clear distinction and political agents’ 
desire to stem the flow of asylum seekers. As such, it fails to capture the real-world blurring 
of boundaries of migration determinants. The stark contrast between bureaucracy and 
reality is a crux in this research study. 
Along with challenges to past narratives that link migration solely to economic 
decisions, a striking dearth of scholarship addresses Zetter’s “muted conditions” of 
structural inequalities and other determinants of refugeehood. Scholarship tends to react or 
respond, and therefore focus on the policies, case studies, and political actors’ agency. 
Increasingly, migrants appear as perpetual victims, without agency and in need of Western 
                                                 
40 Holly E. Reed, Bernadette Ludwig, and Laura Braslow, “Defining Forced Migration: Categories 
and Boundaries,” in International Handbook of Migration and Population Distribution, ed. Michael White 
and Josh DeWind (New York, NY: Springer, 2016), 606. 
41 van Houtum and van Naerssen, “Bordering, Ordering and Othering,” 129. 
42 Roger Zetter, “More Labels, Fewer Refugees: Remaking the Refugee Label in an Era of 
Globalization,” Journal of Refugee Studies 20, no. 2 (June 2007): 6–7. 
43 Zetter, 7. 
44 Zetter. 
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charity. While van Houtum and van Naerssen shine a light on refugees’ feelings of 
displacement and differentiation, scholars have failed to examine the subjectivity and lived 
experiences of the people who pass through, live at, and work on the border. Their voices 
are often missing and rarely appear combined. These are the muted voices that, 
compounded by bureaucracy, make up the border ecosystem explored in this thesis.  
B. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHOD 
The mixed qualitative methods employed in this research—fictional perspectives 
and historical background—complement each other; they support active learning and 
engagement to address the complex problems at the Southwest border. The fictional 
perspectives offer homeland security practitioners the opportunity to see the problem from 
multiple perspectives: the Honduran youth displaced by crime and violence, the border 
patrol agent he encounters when at the Mexico-U.S. border, and the refugee officer who 
screens him for credible fear.45 These perspectives function as a narrative device that 
unmutes the voices of the transient border community. The voices offer subjectivity—
defined by Bellavita as “individual interpretations and reflections of sense data”—which 
acts as qualitative baseline data.46 The muted voices at the border reconceptualize the 
casually brutal sociotechnical immigration regime through the human eye. The historical 
background bolsters the narratives and refines the baseline information with context, 
datasets, and real-world implications. These efforts beget a holistic and multilayered 
analysis that can enrich current foundational knowledge on homeland security and help the 
U.S. government fulfill its humanitarian obligations and safeguard the homeland. 
                                                 
45 The work of Center for Homeland Defense and Security (CHDS) graduate Catherine Schroeck 
Ventura inspired the use of fictional perspectives. In her master’s thesis, she uses narratives as a 
pedagogical tool to communicate the complexity of U.S. humanitarian programs in a comprehensive and 
detailed manner, and provides a way for readers to understand the “totality of circumstances” that factors 
into the choices individuals make. Social identity theory, which seeks to understand “the other” through 
direct, nuanced interactions was an inspiration for Ventura’s use of fictional scenarios in her thesis. 
Catherine Schroeck Ventura, “Flight Plight: An Examination of Contemporary Humanitarian Immigration 
from Honduras, Cuba, And Syria to the United States with Considerations for National Security” (master’s 
thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2016), https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/48488. 
46 Christopher Bellavita, “How to Learn about Homeland Security,” Homeland Security Affairs 15, 
no. 5 (September 2019): 6, https://www.hsaj.org/articles/15395. 
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1. Muted Voices 
This thesis introduces the term muted voices to describe the feelings, perceptions, 
interpretations—the subjectivity—of the people coexisting in a particular ecosystem. In the 
social sciences, researchers use objective data (e.g., chronology, statistics) to present 
research and produce results; subjectivity is to be avoided at all costs. However, objectivity 
is impossible to achieve, as research can never be truly free of the author’s subjectivity. 
Moreover, the objective approach is restrictive. As Bellavita writes, an objective approach 
“is less helpful in learning about the complex issues that—in my opinion—constitute the 
bulk of the dynamic concerns facing homeland security practitioners.”47 
Fictional narratives tap into the muted voices of the people who live at, work on, 
and pass through the border. Feelings, aspirations, and ambiguity can be hard to describe 
without fictionalization, and the muted voices, even fictionalized, offer richness and 
complexity, delivering a visceral, human account of the dynamic interrelation between the 
U.S. asylum program’s bureaucratic architecture and the people who pass through it. By 
combining the subjective (fictional perspectives) and the objective (historical background), 
this research provides greater clarity and a more complete version of the truth, which can 
achieve a more significant impact.  
2. The Case for Subjectivity 
This research incorporates fictional perspectives—“subjectivity”—as sense data to 
achieve more realistic and nuanced insights into the deterioration of the asylum program 
at the Southwest border. Perhaps the most pertinent discussion of subjectivity in this 
context is Bellavita’s essay, “How to Learn about Homeland Security.”48 In his discussion 
of andragogy in the homeland security context, specifically at the Naval Postgraduate 
School’s Center for Homeland Defense and Security (CHDS), Bellavita contends that the 
subjective approach is especially relevant in learning and researching chaotic regimes such 
as immigration. Bellavita further defines the subjective approach as “a process that begins 
                                                 
47 Bellavita, 5. 
48 Bellavita. 
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with individual interpretations and reflections of sense data and extends through a 
transformational process of presenting and defending one’s observations about homeland 
security to other people.”49 In the context of this thesis, the perspectives in the narratives 
represent real-life observations and interpretations of USCIS’s interactions with the 
transient border community. The concept of muted voices expands on the intellectual 
endeavor to centralize the subjects—the people—and their subjectivity in a humane and 
ethical manner. This treatment can produce a thorough, radical understanding. 
Bellavita uses the Cynefin framework to support the benefits of subjectivity in 
learning about homeland security. The Cynefin framework is a sense-making tool created 
by David Snowden that categorizes cause-and-effect relationships into five domains: 
simple, complicated, complex, chaotic, and disorder (see Figure 1).50 According to 
Bellavita, homeland security issues reside in the complex and chaotic domains, where 
experience comes before understanding; therefore, data is available prior to the application 
of a framework for interpretation. Subjectivity is the experience and the baseline data for 
understanding the cause-effect relationship. Bellavita cautions that an objective approach 
requires order, “but the order is achieved at the risk of constraining too quickly what 
homeland security could become,” and therefore “would ignore the dynamic strategic, 
policy and operational reality faced by many CHDS participants.”51 A subjective 
approach, however, offers a method for understanding an unordered space. 
                                                 
49 Bellavita, 6. 
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Figure 1. Cynefin Framework52 
Studies outside of the homeland security realm also demonstrate that subjectivity 
or fictional narratives can serve as a sense-making tool for understanding complex 
situations. In her research on network resources among women in large corporations facing 
structural changes, Shelley Bird found that narratives provide a means to manage unease 
or apprehension about a situation with an uncertain outcome.53 D.L. Crumbley, Katherine 
Smith, and L. Murphy Smith argue that “educational novels” express “[c]omplex textbook 
material … illustrated … through the scenario unfolding in the novel. Information becomes 
practical as human agents use it to solve problems.”54 Meanwhile, Virginia W. Gerde and 
Spencer Foster found success using graphic novels to “illustrate ethical dilemmas, 
                                                 
52 Adapted from CognitiveEdge, “The Cynefin Framework.” 
53 Shelly Bird, “Sensemaking and Identity: The Interconnection of Storytelling and Networking in a 
Women’s Group of a Large Corporation,” Journal of Business Communication 44, no. 4 (October 2007): 
311–39. 
54 D. Larry Crumbley, Katherine T. Smith, and L. Murphy Smith, “Educational Novels and Student 
Role-Playing: A Teaching Note,” Accounting Education 7, no. 2 (1998): 184. 
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cognitive development, ethical reasoning, and the complexity of social issues” to business 
people.55 Bird summarizes, “Stories not only help us make sense of the actions of others, 
they serve to shape our own identities.”56 
In her survey studying the use of fictional narratives in the social sciences, Cate 
Watson declares the legitimacy of fictional narratives, stating that they “provide a 
potentially distinctive source of data for the social researcher.”57 For Watson, fictional 
narratives are an “ekphrastic device” that can “represent the visual in verbal terms” and 
thus provide information that cannot be otherwise revealed.58 She also underscores the 
potential for a more significant impact: the ability to gain readers’ interest and engagement 
through a more creative representation.  
Education scholars widely accept the use of fictional narratives as a pedagogical 
tool. William O’Meara and Daniel Flage believe that fictional narratives communicate 
complicated problems and can “motivate … students to make informed decisions through 
step-by-step analyses” of crime scenes.59 Narratives invite students to interpret complex 
situations by applying the theories and evaluative methods they have learned. Fictional 
narratives also help students tease out ambiguities, read beyond the obvious for subtext, 
and distinguish between different types of information.60 Janice McDrury and Maxine 
Alterio posit that narratives are flexible, and can be applied to various pedagogical settings 
within different cultures to interpret diverse experiences.61 Kristin Langellier and Eric E. 
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58 Watson, 399. 
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Peterson further explain that, as a method, narratives can be strategic and tactical, allowing 
the researcher to order events, present information, contrast positions, and infuse 
meaning.62 In these ways, narratives can be especially effective for presenting something 
new and unfamiliar, such as a foreign culture, an unfamiliar perspective, or a novel concept.  
Narratives can also provide realism by expressing convoluted, discipline-based 
knowledge through practical, everyday situations. Langellier and Peterson argue that 
narrative is the primary, natural way human beings express their experiences and 
identities.63 The practice of storytelling, they explain, relays human experiences and 
identities for others to consume, comprehend, and critique.64 Narratives fill a gap; while 
other methods focus on objective, substantiated data and official documentation, narratives 
reveal subjectivity by capturing the innermost thoughts, feelings, and aspirations of their 
subjects.65 From the political science perspective, Girma Negash argues that creative work 
offers unique insights into “political life” that “cannot possibly [be] achieve[d] in other 
ways.”66 For Negash, literary narrative discloses the human reasonings and agency—their 
complexities, ambiguity, and openness—that traditional research methods cannot.67 In the 
same way, the imagined scenes in this research offer a reconceptualized border ecosystem 
by merging the creative with theoretical rigor.  
                                                 
62 Kristin Langellier and Eric E. Peterson, Storytelling in Daily Life: Performing Narrative 
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3. Limitations 
While Watson advocates for the usefulness of fictional narratives, she concedes that 
they are not a “cure all.”68 Indeed, as previously noted, the fictional perspective 
methodology is unconventional in traditional social sciences, where objectivity is revered. 
Watson explains, “This reluctance is no doubt the result of a deeply felt need for research 
to be grounded in an empirical reality of something that really happened.”69 Thus, 
researchers often view fictional narratives as make-believe. Although the three narratives 
in this study are fictionalized, they are the aggregates of primary and secondary sources, 
including articles, agency memos, whistleblower reports, collegial conversations, and more 
than a thousand interviews I have conducted as a former asylum officer and a current 
immigration services officer at USCIS. The perspectives reflect real places, practices, and 
immigration policies and programs.  
Events have been fictionalized only to the extent needed to ensure narrative flow 
and to allow for personal and professional privacy. As a federal government employee, I 
am required by law to maintain the confidentiality of all persons I have met within my 
positions. Any resemblance to actual persons or situations is purely coincidental. 
Additionally, I must consider national security concerns with respect to information 
disclosure. Fictional perspectives permit me to present more comprehensive research in 
light of these constraints. 
Ultimately, the point of this research is that subjectivity is a necessary precursor to 
the application of frameworks and other tools—in this case, historical background—that 
refines and attempts to order the issue. This research’s specific intent is to unmute the 
subjective viewpoints of the people who populate the Southwest border, represented by the 
displaced Honduran, the border patrol agent, and the refugee officer. This study views these 
voices as an integral part of humanizing the casual cruelty of immigration bureaucracy. As 
noted, the narratives are aggregates of my lived realities and experiences. My background, 
career, and experiences on the border uniquely qualify me to engage in this type of 
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qualitative research and permit me to give voice to those who live, work, and pass through 
the Southwest border. Likewise, one must acknowledge that objective reality is a fiction. 
Watson evokes French philosopher Jacques Lacan’s understanding of “the Real”—that 
truth is unattainable—to explain that research is inevitably “tak[ing] a narrative and 
fashion[ing] another in response.”70 Because objectivity is itself an illusion, isolating 
information from the sentient researcher’s subjectivity and the individual’s perception is 
nearly impossible.  
In her 2009 exploration of empathy, Watson posits that literary devices can steer 
readers toward a particular opinion or feeling; this poses an ethical challenge.71 Although 
manipulation is a legitimate concern, readers are invited to engage, analyze, and interpret 
the text, which may cause them to reach alternative conclusions or expand on the research. 
In his study on the ethical use of ethnographic fiction, Andrew Sparkes concludes that “the 
end result is a powerful story that has the potential to provoke multiple interpretations and 
responses from readers who differ in their positioning to the story provided.”72 I have used 
fictional narratives in this study to illuminate the complexity and ambiguity of the border 
ecosystem, evoke the emotional toll of bordering, ordering and othering, raise questions 
about U.S. asylum policies and practices on the border, and engage in dialogues to further 
the thinking on these issues.  
Notably, all three fictional narratives presented here feature perspectives from the 
Latinx community.73 The intention is three-fold. First, a significant majority of the asylum 
seekers I met at the Southwest border, and some of the border patrol agents and USCIS 
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officers, are Latinx.74 Second, many Latinx individuals and families who have crossed the 
Mexico-U.S. border are now living and working in the United States and might, 
themselves, be—or have—U.S. citizen children working in the border security or 
immigration fields. Finally, this creative decision heightens the characters’ sentience and 
humanity by expressing the fluidity of their identity and the criticality of their experiences 
in constructing identity, perception, and narrative—their in- and out-group affiliations.  
C. CHAPTER OUTLINE 
This thesis has three main chapters, bookended by this introduction and a 
conclusion. The main chapters contain fictional narratives, each from a different 
perspective, accompanied by historical background. By interweaving historical context and 
fictional perspectives based on facts and lived experiences, this thesis adds flesh and bones 
to the impact of policies and the daily choices individuals make at the border. 
The first fictional perspective recounts the events that displaced a Honduran minor, 
Luis Pedro Gomez Flores, interlaced with background information that contextualizes his 
experiences and interactions. This chapter unpacks some of the drivers of migration, 
including crime, corruption, and poverty, that may lead a minor to leave his home and seek 
protection in the United States. Honduras was chosen as the origin country due to its 
significance to the Southwest border crisis, geographic proximity, and economic and 
political ties to the United States. The second and third perspectives situate the readers at 
the epicenter of the Southwest border crisis. The second perspective describes a day in a 
border patrol agent’s life at the El Paso, Texas, station, when he encounters Luis at the 
Mexico-U.S. border. This chapter offers a view of the suppressed emotions border patrol 
agents harbor and reveals the complexity of the interplay among imagination, emotions, 
law, and duty driven by U.S. border security policies. In the third and final narrative, the 
perspective shifts to that of a refugee officer temporarily detailed to screen migrants for 
credible fear at Cibola County Correctional Center in Milan, New Mexico. The refugee 
                                                 
74 An LA Times article indicates that 2016 U.S. Border Patrol data shows more than half of its total 
agents are Latinx. Brittny Mejia, “Many Latinos Answer Call of the Border Patrol in the Age of Trump,” 
Los Angeles Times, April 23, 2018, https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-citizens-academy-
20180323-htmlstory.html.  
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officer’s experiences reflect the day-to-day changes that have taken place due to technical 
adjustments USCIS made to reduce the asylum backlog, and as a result of executive orders 
meant to deter migration—an extension of the praxis of bordering, ordering, and othering. 
More so, however, this narrative taps into the ethical dilemma USCIS officers experience 
when they witness the effects of these changes and begin to question the bureaucracy’s 
moral ambivalence.  
These fictional perspectives and historical background offer data for analysis and 
recommendations to manage the asylum workflow, deter abuse of the system and of asylum 
seekers, ensure fair determinations, and address migration drivers. Through the analysis, 
this thesis aims to improve the U.S. asylum program’s administration and safeguard the 
U.S. homeland.  
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II. DRIVERS OF MIGRATION: 
THE STORY OF LUIS PEDRO GOMEZ FLORES 
The narratives in this chapter depict the thoughts and recollections of fictional 
Honduran youth Luis Pedro Gomez Flores, moments before he flees his hometown.75 In 
2007, when Luis was six years old, his parents left him with his paternal grandmother, 
Florencia Lourdes Dominguez Rubio, so they could seek work in the United States and 
escape the poverty that lingered, even years later, from Hurricane Mitch. Luis’s 
circumstances, coupled with more extensive external situations that he encountered in 
Honduras, compelled him to later flee to the United States as well. His plight sheds light 
on some of the macro- and micro-level drivers of migration and their complexities. 
Initially, such determinants as poverty, civil wars, and natural disasters separated Luis and 
his family; these factors eventually reinforced the conditions that allowed Luis to migrate. 
Luis’s unmuted voice, along with background information, offers a richer understanding 
of the intricacies of migration as well as the limits of terminological categories: migrant, 
refugee, and displaced. 
People have moved back and forth between Central America and the United States 
for many reasons, pushed and pulled by various macro and micro circumstances. Macro 
circumstances are the large, external forces that shape the natural environment and human 
institutions and infrastructure.76 They include such factors as political instability, 
socioeconomic collapse (e.g., crime, violence, poverty), demographic shifts, and 
environmental degradation.77 Micro circumstances are household or personal factors 
                                                 
75 Luis’s story is based on my lived reality of interviewing and screening asylum seekers. His plight is 
consistent with that of numerous Honduran children who flee their country for refuge. See also, for 
example, Jessica Dineen, “Why Children Are Fleeing Honduras, and What UNICEF Is Doing about It,” 
Forbes, May 21, 2019, https://www.forbes.com/sites/unicefusa/2019/05/21/why-children-are-fleeing-
honduras-and-what-unicef-is-doing-about-it/#49e0fbb351a2. 
76 Francesco Castelli, “Drivers of Migration: Why Do People Move?” Journal of Travel Medicine 25, 
no. 1 (January 2018), https://doi.org/10.1093/jtm/tay040. 
77 Dan Restrepo, Trevor Sutton, and Joel Martinez, Getting Migration in the Americas Right: A 




specific to each individual and shared by many in the same locale. These determinants—
including education, marital status, occupation, health, personal attitude, household 
decision-making, and social network—play a vital role in an individual’s decision to 
migrate.78 In this way, the resolve of today’s migrants and displaced people demonstrate 
the same macro and micro influences.  
 Given these complexities, the tendency to distinguish migration as either forced or 
voluntary is problematic. Most scholarship neglects to explore the nuances of migration 
determinants and the inadequacy of such labels as migrant, displaced, and refugee. 
Meanwhile, the asylum ecosystem is set up to erase nuances and delineate an individual as 
either a refugee—a victim, without agency, in need of compassion—or a migrant—a 
cunning individual who is exploiting the generosity of the United States for financial gains. 
This chapter examines some of these factors by unmuting the young Honduran asylum 
seeker Luis’s voice.  
 The first of this chapter section introduces Luis within the context of his 
environment: the poverty and political instability that have become norms in Honduras. 
Luis’s story reveals the complexities of macro- and micro-level determinants at play—how 
they intertwine, enforce, and compel an individual reaction that reverberates for 
generations. For instance, Luis’s grandfather was a pioneer, one of the first in his town to 
migrate. He left Honduras for better economic opportunities, joining the thousands of 
Salvadorans, Guatemalans, and Nicaraguans fleeing civil wars by emigrating to the United 
States. Luis’s grandfather’s remittances enabled the family to survive, and his success 
inspired those with the ability and opportunity to relocate. After Hurricane Mitch 
devastated Honduras in the 1990s, Luis’s uncles migrated north with the money their father 
had saved for their trip. Their remittances, in turn, funded the journey north for Luis’s 
parents.  
                                                 
78 Castelli, “Drivers of Migration.” 
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A. FLEEING HONDURAS: LUIS’S PERSPECTIVE (PART I) 
Luis starts shaking at the thought of opening the door. The mareros usually like to 
get up around noon, after their all-night casa loca barbarity…they are not up at this hour 
unless they are going after something big. 79 The mareros always have people watching, 
but Luis knows they would be satisfied to get his grandmother’s house, where she had run 
her baleada business until last year, 2018.80  
Luis understands that he is leaving a home that has belonged to his family for 
generations. His grandmother, Doña Florencia, often repeats the family’s history to her 
friends, and his father and uncles use some of the money sent by Luis’s abuelo to make 
improvements on the house whenever they can. They have reinforced the foundation, built 
a new bedroom, and even expanded the kitchen. His grandmother tells others with pride 
how their home is one of the few in their town that escaped significant damage from the 
hurricane in 1998, some years before Luis was born. Most of the farms in their town had 
been destroyed and the families unable to recover. Luis’s family avoided starvation 
because of the money and goods his abuelo steadfastly sent home from the United States 
every few months.  
Those years of hardship, however, convinced Luis’s father and his two uncles to 
join his abuelo in the United States. Once they had saved enough money, each of them left 
the town of San Pedro Zacapa, one by one, to make the same journey north. In 2007, 
Luis’s parents were the last to leave for the United States—this time with the money that 
his uncles had painstakingly earned and sent home. In 2019, it is finally Luis’s turn to 
make the journey. 
****** ***** 
                                                 
79 Casas locas (crazy houses) are local gang headquarters where murder and torture take place. See 
Sarah Ferguson, “Growing Up Surrounded by Violence in Central America,” UNICEF USA, October 17, 
2018, https://www.unicefusa.org/stories/growing-surrounded-violence-central-america/34580.  
Mareros are gang members. They belong in a mara, a gang. In the Northern Triangle of Central 
America, maras generally refer to either the Mara Salvatrucha (also known as MS-13 or MS) or its rival, 
the 18th Street Gang (also known as Calle 18, Barrio 18, Mara 18, and La 18). 
80 Baleada is a hearty Honduran snack: a wheat tortilla filled with refried beans and other ingredients, 
folded over.  
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It is just a twenty-minute walk to the bus station, and Luis is a fast walker. The 
world outside of San Pedro Zacapa terrifies him. He has only been to the capital, 
Tegucigalpa, once, as a child, with his parents. While San Pedro Zacapa is small, 
Tegucigalpa is huge. He remembers being surrounded by stomping legs, hurried by his 
parents to follow along. When he was too tired, his dad carried him, and he could see the 
densely packed, dilapidated shacks juxtaposed against the spikes of distant steel towers. 
On his journey to America, Luis knows he must stay alert and avoid becoming 
disoriented like he was in Tegucigalpa. (Figure 2 illustrates the town of San Pedro 
Zacapa, located in the Department of Santa Barbara—shown by the red marker—and its 
proximity to Honduras’s capital of Tegucigalpa.) 
 
Figure 2. San Pedro Zacapa in Santa Barbara, Honduras81 
                                                 




Luis has been to one other big city before. A year ago, he had traveled with some 
friends to the departmental capital, Santa Barbara, to join the protest against JOH.82 But 
Luis was too scared to do anything other than watch from the sidelines and shout along 
with the protesters as they passed. He and his friends ran away at the first sight of the 
police, who arrived in full military gear to break up the demonstrations. Many protesters 
ended up getting injured. Afterward the police went around the neighborhoods arresting 
the protestors, including Miguel’s cousin. The family still has not heard from him. 
Doña Florencia was livid when Luis returned from Santa Barbara. She 
threatened to beat him with her cane—though Luis knew she would not have been able to 
lift it without falling. But her vocal cords were surprisingly strong, and she chastised him 
for hours. She had seen her friends, neighbors, husband, and sons engaged in peaceful 
and even violent political protests over the years. It was all useless. When the former 
president José Manuel Zelaya Rosales, or “Mel,” introduced modest changes to make the 
system more equitable, the mining corporations and agribusinesses, which really pull the 
strings, had the military dispose of him. The violent crackdowns against Mel’s supporters 
in 2009 made Doña Florencia fearful of Luis’s growing interest in politics.83  
****** ***** 
Luis takes a deep breath, puts on his backpack, and opens the door into the cool 
January air.  
                                                 
82 Honduras is divided into eighteen administrative or political subdivisions knowns as departments; 
Santa Barbara is one of the departments, and its capital is also called Santa Barbara. JOH is the nickname 
of Juan Orlando Hernandez Alvarado, the president of Honduras when this thesis was written; he has been 
in power since 2014. 
83 Jose Manuel Zelaya Rosales, nicknamed Mel, was the president of Honduras from January 2006 
until he was exiled to Chile by the military in what some have labeled a coup. His politics changed from 
right wing to left while he was in office. He pushed to resolve land disputes, instituted a minimum wage, 
and created social programs to help families living in extreme poverty. See Nina Lakhani, “Did Hillary 




B. POVERTY AND POLITICAL INSTABILITY  
This section situates Luis’s story within the history of Honduras and explains how 
poverty and political instability have become daily realities. The economic and political 
ties between Honduras and the closest regional powerhouse, the United States, plays a 
significant role. The influence of the United States reached a destructive apex when death 
squads and civil wars in the 1980s led to the first big wave of Central American migration. 
These events decreased economic opportunities, which pushed Luis’s grandfather to join 
the many Salvadorans, Guatemalans, and Nicaraguans traveling to the United States, where 
the 1980 Refugee Act established the asylum program. Finally, the rise of the maras 
(gangs) in the vacuum left by political instability and corruption created the current 
determinants that drove Luis to leave. 
Throughout its history, Honduras has been inextricably linked to the United States. 
At the time of Honduras’s birth as a nation, the United States was already the most powerful 
country in the Americas.84 In 1823, when Honduras joined the Federation of Central 
American States (FCAS), and in 1853 when it became a separate, independent state, formal 
U.S. recognition was crucial to its legitimacy as a nation.85 Once U.S. banana companies, 
specifically the United Fruit Company and Standard Fruit Company, established 
plantations in Honduras in the late nineteenth century, the country became not only 
politically but also economically entangled with the United States.86 A literal banana 
republic, Honduras experienced political instability when plantation workers protested 
harsh conditions and low wages.87 The United States protected its business interests by 
                                                 
84 Two years after they declared their independence from Spain, on September 15, 1821, the areas that 
became Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua became the FCAS under General 
Manuel Jose Arce. In 1838 the federation began to dissolve as each area became an independent nation. 
“Honduras,” Department of State Office of the Historian, accessed July 22, 2019, https://history.state.gov/
countries/honduras. 
85 Department of State. 
86 Walter LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America, 2nd ed. (New York, 
NY: W.W. Norton, 1993). 
87 “Honduras, Battalion 316: Torture and Forced Disappearance,” Center for Justice and 
Accountability, accessed July 22, 2019, https://cja.org/where-we-work/honduras/. 
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sending troops to crush rebellions and support the unpopular regimes; the U.S. Army 
intervened in Honduras on numerous occasions throughout the early twentieth century.88 
Honduras and the other Central American countries quite literally became America’s 
backyard. 
During the Cold War, the main U.S. concern was to prevent Soviet influence and 
stop the spread of communism. According to historian Walter LaFeber, the United States 
often intervened in the sovereignty of Central American countries by supplying military 
and financial aid to authoritarian regimes to fight leftists and nationalist political 
movements, or by orchestrating covert operations that either supported military coups or 
directly overthrew leftist regimes.89 In his seminal book Inevitable Revolutions, LaFeber 
describes how the United States trained government forces in Guatemala, El Salvador, 
Nicaragua, and Honduras; these forces subsequently committed atrocities and human rights 
violations against real and perceived political opponents.90 LaFeber’s compelling research 
shows that these repressions led to more civil conflicts and communist revolutions.  
The instability of the government, the brutality of conflicts, poor development, and 
natural disasters drove migration in Central America. According to the Migration Policy 
Institute, the civil wars between authoritarian regimes and leftist movements in the 
neighboring countries of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua led to the first large-scale 
northward migration, resulting in a tripling of Central Americans in the United States—
from 354,000 in 1980 to 1,134,000 in 1990.91 Moreover, persistent insecurity, instability, 
and economic hardship after the conflicts pushed Central Americans to migrate. In 1998, 
the Category 5 Hurricane Mitch landed on Honduras and the surrounding areas. The 
ensuing poverty triggered a second large wave of migration as Hondurans made the 
arduous journey to the U.S. Southwest border.  
                                                 
88 LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions. 
89 LaFeber. 
90 LaFeber. 
91 Jeanne Batalova, Jessica Bolter, and Allison O’Connor, “Central American Immigrants in the 
United States,” Migration Policy Institute, August 15, 2019, https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/
central-american-immigrants-united-states. 
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Honduras has long been an embattled state with weak democratic institutions. The 
country has few stable institutions and ranks among the lowest “in terms of per capita 
income, employment, literacy, health care, life expectancy, and nutrition” since the 
1980s.92 The people were optimistic about their future when the military returned the 
power of rule and the country elected its first civilian government in 1982.93 According to 
Peter J. Meyer of the Congressional Research Service, since then, two ideologically similar 
political factions, the Partido Liberal (PL, or liberal party) and the Partido Nacional (PN, 
or national party), have dominated the government and politics.94 Meyer recounts that in 
2005, PL member José Manuel Zelaya Rosales defeated his PN rival in the presidential 
election. Despite the PL party’s center-right stance, President Zelaya welcomed better 
relations with such leftist countries as Venezuela and joined regional, socialist economic 
alliances. Some of his policies—for example, increasing the minimum wage by 60 percent, 
providing free school enrollment, and increasing the salary of educators—were also left-
leaning initiatives. Meyer concludes that many among the political and economic elite 
considered President Zelaya a threat to the status quo. Thus, inevitably, Honduras 
continued to rank low on the development index.  
Honduran politics reached a brink over presidential term limits. On June 28, 2009, 
the Honduran military and traditional economic and political elites forced the 
democratically elected President Zelaya into exile in Costa Rica, replacing him with the 
head of the Honduran Congress, Roberto Micheletti.95 According to Hillary Clinton, then 
U.S. secretary of state, Micheletti and the Honduran Supreme Court claimed they were 
protecting the democracy of Honduras by preventing Zelaya from extending his term limit 
                                                 
92 Roger A. Carvajal, “Violence in Honduras: An Analysis of the Failure in Public Security and the 
State’s Response to Criminality” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2009), 112. 
93 Peter J. Meyer, Honduras: Background and U.S. Relations, CRS Report No. RL34027 
(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, April 27, 2020), 3, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/
RL34027.pdf. 
94 Meyer, 3. 
95 Government Accountability Office, Honduran Political Crisis 2009 (Washington, DC: Government 
Accountability Office, 2019), 1, https://www.gao.gov/assets/590/585824.pdf. 
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under the guise of reforming the constitution.96 Although this narrative framed the removal 
as a necessary move to prevent Zelaya from grabbing power, critics pointed out that Zelaya 
technically could not become president for a second term without being chosen by the 
people in a free election.97 Although seeking limitless power threatened democracy, so did 
an ouster of a democratically elected leader. 
Critics also questioned the role the United States played in Zelaya’s exile. The 
United States, in agreement with most governments around the world, initially labeled the 
removal a coup and temporarily suspended its financial assistance and other support.98 
However, the United States did not remove its ambassador; instead, the country called for 
immediate elections and quickly recognized the new government under Porfirio Lobo after 
the November 2009 election.99 Some accused the United States of being behind the coup 
to advance its neoliberal agenda.100 Clinton argued that the United States advocated for 
new elections to quickly return political stability and U.S. financial aid to Honduras.101 
However, Honduras experienced little peace and prosperity in the aftermath.  
The party in power seized the opportunity to tighten democratic space. In the 
months between the June ouster and the new administration under Porfirio Lobo, Micheletti 
and his supporters voided many of Zelaya’s changes.102 They also imposed strict measures 
to control any opposition.103 They instituted arbitrary curfews and states of emergency, 
                                                 
96 Lakhani, “Hillary Clinton” 
97 Lakhani. 
98 Government Accountability Office, Honduran Political Crisis, 1. 
99 Government Accountability Office, 6. 
100 Democracy Now, “Ousted Honduran President Zelaya: U.S.-Backed Coup Destabilized My 
Nation Forcing Migrants to Flee,” YouTube, July 5, 2019, 36:02, https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=Jr4FpbnSH00. 
101 Lakhani, “Hillary Clinton.” 
102 Peter J. Meyer, Honduran-U.S. Relations, CRS Report No. RL34027 (Washington, DC: 
Congressional Research Service, 2010), 2. 
103 Meyer, 3. 
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controlled the media, and suppressed civil and political rights.104 Amnesty International 
reported “widespread human rights violations against civilians by police and military 
officials, including excessive use of force, unlawful killings, torture and other ill treatment, 
arbitrary arrest and harassment and intimidation of opponents to the coup” under the 
interim government.105 With the PL splintered, the PN, headed by Juan Orlando 
Hernández (JOH), ascended to top leadership positions and dominated all three 
government branches.106 Thus, the government seized the opportunity of instability to 
increase its power with impunity. 
The rapidly deteriorating political situation led directly to increased crime, more 
corruption, and complete impunity. In 2017, JOH won a heavily contested second term in 
an election that many considered rigged.107 Ironically, through its control of the judicial 
branch, the PN maneuvered a ruling to allow a second term for the presidency—the same 
proposal that supposedly led to Zelaya’s removal from office.108 InSight Crime reports 
that JOH enjoyed close ties with the United States; he collaborated with the United States 
on drug trafficking and reinstituted the extradition of traffickers.109 However, in Honduras, 
he was unpopular and plagued by scandals. Demonstrators took to the streets to protest the 
results of the election. Sporadic protests continued against the legitimacy of the JOH 
administration as well as such other grievances as privatization, inequality, and 
corruption.110 The clashes between dissenters, police, and JOH supporters resulted in 
                                                 
104 Meyer, 3. 
105 Amnesty International, Honduras: Recommendations to the New Honduran Government 
Following the Coup of June 2009, 28 January 2010 (London, UK: Amnesty International, 2010), 6, 
https://www.refworld.org/docid/4b67f3f52.html. 
106 Meyer, Honduran-U.S. Relations, 3. 
107 Democracy Now, “Ousted Honduran President Zelaya.” 
108 Meyer, Honduras, 4. 
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deaths, arbitrary detention, and irregular prosecution.111 These conditions contributed to 
the current wave of families and unaccompanied alien children migrating north to escape 
the poor conditions in Honduras. 
Although the United States has provided substantial aid to Honduras following the 
country’s transition to civilian rule, with few exceptions, it is tied to U.S. interests. 
According to Peter Meyer, “aid levels were particularly high during the 1980s and early 
1990s, as Honduras served as a base for U.S. operations in Central America.”112 In the 
years that followed, the United States significantly reduced its funding, aside from disaster 
relief following Hurricane Mitch and a development grant to Honduras associated with the 
2005 Millennium Challenge Corporation. The Obama administration launched a strategic 
plan to tackle the humanitarian crisis at the border in 2014, called the U.S. Strategy for 
Engagement in Central America. Since FY 2016, Congress has provided Guatemala, 
Honduras, and El Salvador approximately $2.6 billion in development aid as a part of this 
strategy. However, the Trump administration blocked the $498 million set aside for 
Honduras until its government signed the Asylum Cooperation Agreement. This agreement 
effectively prevented displaced individuals from obtaining asylum in the United States 
without first seeking asylum in transit countries such as Guatemala and Mexico.113 This 
example shows that the U.S. strategy in the Northern Triangle continues to rely on a carrot-
and-stick approach.  
U.S. foreign aid has also been unable to promote democracy, human rights, rules 
of law, development, and security to mitigate mass migration. Some studies indicate that 
developmental aid, though it promotes increased income and opportunities, leads to higher 
                                                 
111 “Honduras Profile,” InSight Crime, March 27, 2017, https://www.insightcrime.org/honduras-
organized-crime-news/honduras/. 
112 Meyer, Honduras, 12. 
113 Meyer, 10; Daniel Trotta, “U.S. Restores Aid to Central America after Reaching Migration 
Deals,” Reuters, October 17, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-immigration-aid-
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migration flow since the extra income often facilitates the journey north.114 While, both 
countries launched deterrence campaigns warning of the perilous journey northward and 
the complicated process of obtaining asylum, they fell on deaf ears. The United States 
needs a novel, regionwide response to mass displacement.  
C. GANG RECRUITMENT: LUIS’S PERSPECTIVE (PART II)  
Luis’s story up to this point has centered on the peripheral forces that compelled 
him to leave Honduras. In this section, he comes face to face with direct violence and 
threats from the mara, specifically Barrio 18. Crime, violence, and corruption are the main 
drivers of Luis’s migration. Given his individual circumstances, specifically his social 
network and household decision-making, Luis has one avenue for relief: fleeing to the 
United States. Luis’s perspective reveals the interplay of weak state institutions, elites’ 
indifference, impunity, and an ineffectual justice system with such micro-level 
determinants as the social network and household decision-making at work.  
In Luis’s case, poverty and political instability contributed to other macro-level 
circumstances, including the rise of crime and violence, a dearth of civil and economic 
participation, and the loss of livelihood. These circumstances, coupled with such micro-
level factors as the death of his closest relative, financial and logistical support from his 
family in the United States, memories of travel, and his family’s culture of migration, 
culminates in the option to flee. As Luis starts his journey toward the United States, he is 
following the footsteps of many youths who traveled through dangerous terrain and 
situations to seek asylum and reunite with their families. The same drivers, then, produce 
caravans of similarly situated people with the same intent, traveling together as groups for 
protection and safety.115  
****** ***** 
                                                 
114 Kathleen Newland, Migration, Development, and Global Governance: From Crisis toward 
Consolidation (Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2019), 5, https://www.migrationpolicy.org/
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115 Jill H. Wilson et al., Recent Migration to the United States from Central America: Frequently 
Asked Questions, CRS Report No. R45489 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2019), 26, 
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The first time Barrio 18 threatened him, Luis was heading home from school, a 
few weeks after starting tenth grade. It was September 2016. He was only fifteen years 
old and smaller than most boys his age. Five of the gang members were hanging out at 
Parque Central, listening to music, drinking, and smoking. Two of them had guns—their 
outlines were in plain sight, tucked into their pants under their basketball jerseys. Luis 
usually took a different route if he saw mareros, but he was in a hurry to get home and 
did not notice them until it was too late.  
Luis’s classmate, Juan, had started hanging out with Barrio 18 over the summer 
and became one of their paisas.116 Juan recognized Luis as he walked by, and called out 
to him. Luis was petrified. He wanted to run in the opposite direction, but he knew that it 
would make matters worse. He walked over cautiously, and Juan made small talk, asking 
Luis about some of the other kids at school. Turning toward his Barrio 18 friends to look 
for approval, Juan also made sexual comments about the female teachers and some of the 
girls at school. Then Juan asked Luis how much lempira he had on him.117 Luis took out 
the 250 his grandmother had given him to buy school supplies. Juan took the money and 
patted Luis twice on his left cheek. “Good. Next time, have more,” he said, and turned to 
laugh with his friends. Luis felt the left side of his face burning. He quickly ran home and 
felt in his stomach the start of something terrible. 
After this incident, Luis started avoiding Parque Central on his way home, but his 
alternate routes did not prove much safer. One day in November, as he was walking past 
the Iglesía Católica, he heard someone call his name. Luis pretended not to hear and 
kept walking. All of a sudden, two guys were on him, beating him to the ground. Juan 
grabbed him and slammed him hard against the wall of a building, screaming into his 
face, “Next time, you better stop when I call you!” His one-time classmate menaced him 
                                                 
116 Paisas is the plural of paisa, which is short for paisano, or countryman. The 18th Street Gang calls 
their prospective soldiers paisas. See InSight Crime and Asociación para una Sociedad más Justa, Gangs in 
Honduras (Washington, DC: USAID, 2016), 16, https://www.insightcrime.org/images/PDFs/2015/
HondurasGangs.pdf. 
117 Lempira is the currency of Honduras. One lempira is worth about 4 cents on the U.S. dollar.  
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further, “You will do what we tell you. We own you, bandera. Come see us tomorrow. We 
got something for you to do.”118   
A rival gang, the Mara Salvatrucha, had been moving into San Pedro Zacapa. 
Reputed members seemed to be setting up shop on the other side of the Rio Zacapa. 
Three nights ago, two motorcycles drove by an 18th Street gang casa loco and shot it up, 
killing four Barrio 18 mareros. The next afternoon, the residents saw a police patrol in 
town. The police officer did not interview anyone about the hit. Instead, he stopped only 
at Barrio 18’s main casa. The neighbors whispered that the police officer came to drop 
off weapons in exchange for money. The Barrio 18 gang now needed recruits to fight the 
turf war.  
When Luis arrived home, he was not able to hide the beating from Doña 
Florencia. He told her what had happened, and she quickly packed him a bag and sent 
him to her friend’s house in Agua Caliente, a twenty-minute drive from San Pedro 
Zacapa.  
Six months later, in May 2017, Doña Florencia called Luis to say that it was safe 
to return. On top of the renta for her baleada business, she had started paying the Barrio 
18 gang extra to not recruit Luis.119 Doña Florencia never even considered telling Luis 
to go to the police—the corruption was so bad. She would need to pay just to see the 
police. Even then, the townspeople never saw a patrol car unless the police came to do 
business with the maras. Doña Florencia, like all the residents, understood that the law 
would not be around when the maras come to retaliate for reporting them. The maras 
ruled the cities and towns and the JOH government interacted with the world outside of 
Honduras. 
****** ****** 
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On November 29, 2018, Doña Florencia died suddenly from a heart attack. She 
had never told Luis’s parents in the United States about the renta for Barrio 18—she just 
said that she had needed extra money each month to support her and Luis. The first time 
his parents found out about the maras was when Luis called to tell them that Barrio 18 
came to his grandmother’s house for the gang’s monthly 5,000 lempiras renta, and he 
had given them the funeral money to avoid getting killed. Juan was there, with his LA 
Clippers jersey and a new “99” tattoo on his cheek. He now had a gun and touched it as 
he smirked at Luis and said, “If you run away again, you had better not come back. We 
will be waiting for you in Doña Florencia’s casa.”  
****** ****** 
As the bus drives past the Rio Zacapa, Luis feels the tightening in his chest abate. 
With his grandmother gone, there is nothing left for him in San Pedro Zacapa. He will 
catch a bus at Santa Barbara to San Pedro Sula, then make his way into the United States 
with a caravan of families and children. Luis’s parents had told him to join a caravan 
because he would be safer traveling with them. They told him, too, that if he is caught, he 
must inform the U.S. government that he is a minor and needs asylum. He memorized the 
English words. (Figure 3 illustrates Luis’s journey out of Honduras.)  
36 
 
Figure 3. Map of Journey out from Honduras120 
Luis’s heartbeat echoes in the chambers of his chest as he imagines a new life 
with his parents and his younger sister, Lourdes, who he has never met, in Union City, 
New Jersey. He will learn English, finish high school, and get a job to help his family. 
Honduras has no opportunities, just crime and corruption. He will never have to face 
Juan and the mareros again. 
D. CRIME, CORRUPTION, AND IMPUNITY  
Crime, corruption, and impunity are everyday macro-level drivers of migration in 
Honduras. U.S. domestic policies have had significant influences on these migration 
determinants, specifically the Honduran government’s lack of capacity to fight crime and 
its inadequate response to violence. Background information contextualizes the dynamics 
between the push and pull determinants of migration in Honduras’s history. The country 
                                                 
120 Source: “San Pedro Zacapa, Honduras,” Google Maps, accessed June 24, 2020, 
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has struggled with security issues for most of its history due to the reign of brutal military 
regimes. However, the late 1990s ushered in a different set of security problems: crime and 
violence. Continued slow development, the lack of economic opportunities, and U.S. 
domestic policies helped fuel the rise of gangs.  
Before the 1990s, gangs in Honduras tended to comprise local delinquents engaged 
in petty crime.121 When the United States passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), which amended the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (INA) in response to a rise in undocumented migrants at the Southern 
border, the spread of gangs was an unintended consequence.122 The act strengthened 
border and interior enforcement, clarified legal and illegal entries, limited appeals, and 
introduced harsher penalties for violations. IIRIRA significantly increased the number of 
Central Americans deported back to the Northern Triangle, and many of the deportees grew 
up in the poor neighborhoods of Los Angeles as members of local U.S. gangs Mara 
Salvatrucha and Barrio 18.123 The massive U.S. deportation of foreign nationals with 
criminal convictions, estimated to be approximately 130,000 from 2001 to 2010, resulted 
in the spread of maras, especially to the NTCA countries.124 Given the economic, political, 
and social instability of these countries, and the lack of support systems to assist with 
reintegration and rehabilitation, the deportees turned to each other and continued their gang 
activities to survive.125 In this way, the United States played a role in the growth of these 
gangs; in turn, the gangs drove up crime, violence, and a resulting push to migrate. 
Honduras and the other Northern Triangle countries were primarily unprepared to 
deal with this growth. These countries’ governments had few tools, little training, and no 
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warning to deal with the gangs. In his report for the Congressional Research Service 
Meyers writes that “in July 2007 testimony before the House Subcommittee on the Western 
Hemisphere, the Honduran Ambassador to the United States asserted that although the 
United States provides information to countries on the criminal background of deportees, 
the information does not include whether the repatriated nationals are gang members.”126 
Local law enforcement was not equipped to handle the sophistication, organization, and 
weapons of the maras; they were quickly overwhelmed.127 Most lacked imagination in 
their response, relying on their familiar strategy of using troops and militarizing the police 
to repress the maras, resulting in more violence.128 The government’s response to gangs 
also stretched the capacity of Honduras’s prison system. Membership increased as gang 
leaders recruited from within the prisons.129 These interrelated factors exacerbated 
Honduras’s security challenges and struggle to respond.  
U.S. demand for illicit drugs is a lucrative business that contributes to crime and 
violence and the maras’ rise in Honduras. Although the maras are mostly local, they have 
ties to transnational criminal organizations.130 Pompeyo Bonilla Reyes, former security 
minister of Honduras under President Lobo, said, “We are between those who consume 
drugs and those who produce them. Logically we are a corridor traffic.”131 Along with 
other NTCA countries, Honduras has remote, isolated areas with little to no government 
presence that serve as natural transit points for the transfers of cocaine and heroin from 
South American producers to American consumers.132 According to Meyer, these areas 
became the battlegrounds of “heavily armed and well-financed transnational criminal 
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organizations … and local affiliates,” many of whom enjoy “close ties to political and 
economic elites who rely upon illicit finances to fund their election campaigns and maintain 
or increase the market share of their businesses.”133 Furthermore, while Honduras and the 
United States cooperate on counternarcotic operations, data indicates that they have been 
ineffective and done little to disrupt the drug trafficking trade. Limited bilateral, regional, 
and international cooperation with the United States, as the historical leader of fighting 
regional crime, coupled with greater isolationism under the Trump administration, further 
encourage gang growth.134 Insight Crime noted in 2018 that this lack of action would lead 
to more migration as the maras gain influence and power given the insatiable demand for 
drugs in the United States, increasing drug use in Latin America, and further expansion 
into human trafficking, mainly due to Venezuelans fleeing their home. U.S. domestic 
affairs continue to have consequences on the health and wealth of the NTCA.  
Corruption permeates Honduras’s political and economic institutions, thanks to the 
symbiotic relations the maras and other criminal organizations enjoy with political and 
economic elites.135 They exchange illicit funds for protection, maintenance of power, 
exploitation, and impunity. Even leadership at the highest level has links to the maras. In 
November 2018, JOH’s brother, Tony Hernández, was arrested for his decade-long 
trafficking of cocaine to the United States.136 In August 2019, a new filing from the FBI 
named JOH and former President Lobo as having colluded with drug traffickers to 
exchange protection for campaign contributions.137 Corruption, thus, affects every level 
of the Honduran government, from local to federal.  
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Impunity goes hand in hand with crime and corruption. In 2014, the United Nations 
(UN) Office on Drugs and Crime reported that the homicide rate in Honduras was the 
highest in the world for nations outside of war, at 90.4 per 100,000 inhabitants.138 The 
2017 Global Impunity Index ranked Honduras twelfth out of sixty-nine countries, above 
El Salvador, in impunity levels.139 InSight Crime reported that a joint investigation by 
Colombia, Honduras, and the United States found that twenty-eight Honduran government 
officials had received bribes to delete gang members’ records and  provide them with fake 
driver’s licenses.140 They also discovered that, between 2012 and 2016, Honduran police 
officers had participated in the trafficking of firearms to gangs.141 Furthermore, the U.S. 
Department of State reported that Honduras has an impunity rate of up to 90 percent in the 
courts, which discourages victims from seeking justice.142 The high crime rate, the 
government’s inability to prosecute, and government corruption have exacerbated 
Hondurans’ lack of confidence in and mistrust of authorities. 
E. ANALYSIS  
The story from Luis’s perspective reveals that the decision to flee Honduras and 
seek asylum in the United States is complicated. Although Luis’s most immediate threat 
was Barrio 18, the country’s conditions and his family history shows that a confluence of 
                                                 
138 UN Office on Drugs and Crime, 2011 Global Study on Homicide Trends, Context, Data (New 
York, NY: United Nations Publications, 2012). 
139 The Universidad de Las Americas Puebla Jenkins Graduate School Center of Studies on Impunity 
and Justice defines impunity as “a multidimensional phenomenon that goes beyond the analysis of crimes 
that could be punished—such as homicide.” Impunity is measured “using two main criteria—first, the 
functionality of the security, and justice systems and the protection of human rights; second, the structural 
and existing capacity of the countries analyzed in this document.” Center of Studies on Impunity and 
Justice, Global Impunity Index 2017 (GII-2017) (Mexico: Universidad de Las Americas Puebla, 2017), 35, 
https://www.udlap.mx/cesij/files/IGI-2017_eng.pdf. 
140 Tristan Clavel, “New Allegations Highlight Continuing Corruption in Honduras Police,” InSight 
Crime, March 27, 2017, https://www.insightcrime.org/news/brief/new-allegations-highlight-continuing-
corruption-honduras-police/. 
141 Clavel. 
142 Department of State, 2019 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Honduras (Washington, 
DC: Department of State, 2019), https://www.state.gov/reports/2019-country-reports-on-human-rights-
practices/honduras/. 
41 
macro- and micro-level factors, including social networks, economics, political instability, 
and impunity, paved the way for his journey north. Luis’s subjective experience reveals 
that reunification with family members is just as compelling a factor as gang threats and 
violence to propel an individual to leave his or her country. In Luis’s case, with his 
grandmother’s death, his closest living relatives were all in the United States, albeit 
illegally.  
Many Hondurans, like Luis, have relatives abroad and survive on remittances from 
overseas. For two decades starting in the 1990s, the Honduran diaspora rapidly expanded 
among the immigrants from the NTCA countries; by 2009, for every 1,000 people in 
Honduras, 63 were living in the United States.143 Through remittances and logistical 
support, social ties in the United States translate to capabilities—in Luis’s case, the option 
to flee.144 Ostensibly, Luis may even avoid violence or gang recruitment from Barrio 18 
by offering to pay higher renta through his family’s financial assistance. Luis and his 
grandmother survived on remittances and, notably, the money paid for Luis’s journey to 
the Mexico-U.S. border as well as for his uncles’ and his parents’ journeys.  
A superficial connection between economic advancement and migration is easy to 
make, but it is misleading. Luis’s story unearths the nuances of each trip north. Although 
Honduras may not have suffered a civil war in the 1980s, it suffered from incredible social, 
political, and economic unrest and strife. Moreover, Salvadorians and Nicaraguans fleeing 
civil war paved the way for Luis’s grandfather, while his uncles left due to a natural disaster 
in 1998 that caused severe poverty. One may argue that Luis’s parents left for economic 
advancement. According to the UN Economic Commission for Latin American and the 
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Caribbean, an estimated 74 percent of Hondurans lived in poverty in 2015.145 Conversely, 
Luis’s voice shows that while economic advancement plays a significant role in driving 
many Hondurans to the United States, other micro and macro drivers can set the stage, 
including the underlying causes of poverty. As Zetter points out, “voluntary” migration 
may be a product of structural inequalities and poverty from years of discrimination and 
exploitation.146  
Whether he found a way to refuse or was forced to join the mara’s turf war, Luis 
would more likely than not have ended up in harm’s way. The people in Luis’s town 
instinctively understood that the state authorities were unwilling and unable to help; they 
regularly saw evidence of police officers working with the mareros. Luis and his 
grandmother knew that turning to the police for help was not an option. This historical 
background contextualizes the widespread corruption and political instability and 
demonstrates that the government cannot, or will not, protect its citizens. In Honduras, 
government corruption and, at times, collaboration with the maras results in impunity and 
inefficient investigation into crimes.147 With the state’s instability and the maras 
expanding their network beyond NTCA to Belize and Mexico, relocation to the United 
States was Luis’s only viable option.148 Luis is privileged; his ties in the United States 
facilitated his travel by providing him with money and connections. 
U.S. media, politicians, scholars, and Department of Homeland Security 
employees, including border patrol agents and USCIS officers, often lump all those 
traveling toward the border under the label migrants. As discussed, the term migrant 
connotes voluntary migration for economic reasons; this overly restrictive generalization 
is deliberate and a function of a bureaucracy that requires strict categorization. Although 
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readers come to know the total circumstances from Luis’s perspective, a young adult like 
Luis would have difficulty making these connections himself and articulating them in front 
of a USCIS officer at his credible fear screening. Such interacting factors speak to the 
complexity of the border ecosystem and the interplay between members of the transient 
community and the U.S. asylum program’s bureaucratic architecture at the border that 
abides by simple rules.  
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III. CONTROL AND CRISIS: 
THE STORY OF BORDER PATROL AGENT ADRIAN MARTINEZ 
On the Mexico-U.S. border, the American government has erected systems and 
processes to control, differentiate, and manage the flow of goods and people. Henk van 
Houtum and Ton van Naerssen write, “Borders do not represent a fixed point in space or 
time, rather they symbolize a social practice of spatial differentiation.”149 They identify 
these activities as “bordering, ordering and othering” and state that they intensified 
significantly after 9/11.150 The U.S. Border Patrol (BP)—an arm of U.S. Customs and 
Border Protection (CBP)—enforces the praxis of these activities. I contend that the 
conflicting roles and expectations involved in this process create distancing and emotional 
anguish among border enforcers and may place them in an irreconcilable situation. A case 
in point of the consequences, intended and unintended, of bordering, ordering and othering 
unfolds in the fictional story of Adrian Martinez, a seasoned border patrol agent. 
After failing out of the Denver Police Academy, Adrian Martinez joined the BP as 
a border patrol agent in 2013, when he was only twenty-three years old. Although his 
original intent was simply to gain experience before attempting to join the police force 
again, one year with the Border Patrol turned into six, and within that time he experienced 
tremendous changes in his role and responsibilities. He used weapons, wore body armor, 
and mastered the technique of line watching, and he also saw and engaged in activities that 
left him with psychological wounds. He saw changes that, in his opinion, were causing 
border management to unravel; border patrol agents were originally seen as mounted 
watchmen, but they had begun to operate, now, in a highly militarized state. This chapter, 
through Martinez’s story, highlights one of the unforeseen consequences of bordering, 
ordering and othering: the mental toll it takes on the people who enforce U.S. border laws 
and policies.  
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A. BODIES ON THE BORDER: MARTINEZ’S PERSPECTIVE (PART I) 
Martinez, sitting in his dusty green and white Jeep Wrangler, finally spots Jonas’s 
matching Jeep hustling toward him. It’s Friday, and he wonders to himself if the end of 
the week is worse for the mind. He has worked three sixteen-hour shifts since Monday. 
They’re strapped for personnel, so overtime is always available. The money is great, but 
what’s the use when you’re too exhausted to spend it? 
Martinez squints across the unforgiving landscape as the matching Jeep closes 
in—miles of open space dotted with shrubby vegetation and limestone ridges that blend 
and blur under the heat. The Chihuahuan Desert is endless. 
Jonas pulls up next to Martinez, rolls down his window, and hands Martinez his 
lunch. 
“Thanks, buddy,” says Martinez. “Hey, are you and your girl going to the music 
festival Sunday afternoon?” 
Jonas takes off his sunglasses and shakes his head. Looking down, he says in 
monotone, “Adrian, Ashley and I are heading back to San Diego. She can’t handle this 
life anymore. It’s either her or the job, she says.”  
****** ****** 
Martinez eats his lunch inside his Jeep, watching the mobile monitor of the 
portable radar camera unit. He moves his Grappler and night vision goggle to the side, 
careful not to get any crumbs or grease on the expensive toys.151 Martinez thinks over 
his conversation with Jonas and shakes his head. How could Jonas let a woman tell him 
what to do?  
But Jonas had changed recently. Just the other day, Martinez had lost his 
temper—a typical occurrence for most of the guys on the job—as he lifted a slight 
Guatemalan man off the ground by the shoulders, shaking and cursing at him. Martinez 
and Jonas had just dragged the man out of the Rio, and the bastard had casually changed 
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into his dry clothes while his kid, who had nearly drowned, was still shivering 
uncontrollably in his wet clothes. The kid probably wasn’t even his. Often, these border 
crossers pick up kids for a fee and use them to get asylum.  
Suddenly, Jonas became agitated. He shouted, “Stop Adrian, please stop it.” 
Though smaller in stature than Martinez, Jonas forced Martinez to let go of the man. 
Then, out of nowhere, he turned to face the rocks and began to shake with quiet sobs. 
Martinez’s anger dissipated. He had to calm Jonas down. 
“Look, I wasn’t hurting him. He is fine.” 
They both glanced at the Guatemalan, who nonchalantly fixed his clothes and 
went about arranging his belongings. 
“What has gotten into you? Too much excitement from the little swim?” Martinez 
asked Jonas. “It’s all good. Let’s head back to the station with this bastard.” 
Martinez knew Jonas was still getting settled in El Paso. He had relocated from 
San Diego and still wasn’t used to the desert. When Martinez and his buddies made 
flippant remarks or joked to each other about the migrants—locker room talk, you know, 
about having sex with the migrants, referring to them as tonks, joking about their shithole 
countries—Jonas seemed uncomfortable. But you can’t overthink these things. The job is 
stressful and life here is hard. You have to get through the days. 
Martinez decides he has to talk to Jonas. He has seen too many leave the job and 
get depressed, or worse.  
Martinez’s thinks about his own journey in the job. After the thing with the police 
academy, the Border Patrol was the easiest way to rebound, and a quick stint would be 
easy. But he was still in the desert six years later. Border apprehensions were at a low 
point when he joined the patrol, but the work intensified each year with more migrants, 
new tricks, increasing paperwork and meaningless checkboxes, and greater scrutiny. The 
days became long. When he gets off work now he is too exhausted to look for a new job.  
Now twenty-nine years old, Martinez is one of the most senior agents around and 
one of the few with a college degree. He’s the one who shows the new guys the ropes, 
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dealing with the brunt of the headache when personnel reassign to El Paso from other 
units within the CBP. Unlike Jonas, who is a border patrol agent, these CBP reassignees 
are customs officers, immigration inspectors, and agricultural inspectors. They are not 
accustomed to the heat of the work and the environment. They complain, refuse to learn, 
and eventually find excuses to leave. Since the beginning of the 2019 fiscal year, about 
fifty officers had come and gone.  
The migrant groups had been getting bigger and were coming more frequently, 
too. Martinez and his team regularly find one or two hundred illegal border crossers a 
day, sometimes even three hundred, and they’re no longer the single male Mexicans 
Martinez was used to. Now, these criminals—if not narcos, then domestic abusers—are 
coming to the border with their women and children. The media has come to expect 
border patrol agents to be caseworkers and caretakers. But even processing the 
increasing numbers of migrants is an administrative disaster, lasting into the early 
mornings. The temperatures drop significantly at night, and people get sick. Martinez 
and his colleagues end up changing diapers and making burritos instead of protecting 
the border. 
The coyotes, however, have access to sophisticated equipment.152 Their 
associates give them instructions about the next move based on satellite imagery, and 
they even have drones reporting the locations of agents. The coyotes also frequently 
abandon the migrants. The migrants have no idea where they are going and often end up 
walking in the desert for days. Many end up dead from the heat and dehydration. 
Martinez still sees the desiccated bodies in his sleep. He cannot bury the images. 
B. BROKEN BORDER: FROM INSPECTORS TO POLICE 
CBP’s worst year ever, arguably, was 2019. The problems were linked to its largest 
unit, the U.S. Border Patrol, which had plagued CBP with poor management and personnel 
misconduct for years. In 2019, the media reported scandals to include the death of at least 
                                                 
152 Coyote refers to an individual hired to guide an undocumented person over the Mexico-U.S. 
border.  
49 
twelve migrants in CBP’s custody, the discovery of a secret BP Facebook group where 
personnel made racist remarks, overcrowded and substandard detention facilities, staff 
suicides, and even a serial killer among the ranks of BP agents.153 Moreover, the BP 
appears inefficient and ineffective: despite fewer apprehensions and more agents, the BP 
is still understaffed, undertrained, and overwhelmed by migrants.154 The organization has 
dealt with years of rapid workforce expansion and misalignment between policy and reality 
without effectively confronting the erosion of agency identity, integrity, and efficacy.155 
The result has been detrimental to the migrants and to the agents who apprehend them.  
The BP has undergone significant transformations throughout its history. Initially, 
informal agents were simply mounted watchmen who sporadically patrolled the Southwest 
border, looking mainly for immigrants attempting to circumvent the Chinese Exclusion 
Act of 1882. Congress formally established the U.S. Border Patrol under the Labor 
Appropriation Act of 1924, and the first border patrol agents patrolled U.S. borders on 
horseback to prevent illegal crossings and liquor smuggling.156 In her work on Border 
Patrol history, Kelly Hernandez suggests that even during those early years, the BP’s 
mission was too expansive; agents found it difficult to enforce the organization’s mandate 
and reduced to “racialization and regionalization.”157 Although the BP began to secure the 
Canada-U.S. border in the 1920s, its primary focus switched to the 3,200 kilometers of 
U.S. border with Mexico, and its target became mainly the undocumented border 
                                                 
153 Garrett M. Graff, “The Border Patrol Hits a Breaking Point,” POLITICO, July 15, 2019, 
https://politi.co/2JMc3y1. 
154 “U.S. Border Patrol Total Apprehensions FY1925–FY2019,” U.S. Customs and Border Protection, 
January 2020, https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/assets/documents/2020-Jan/
U.S.%20Border%20Patrol%20Total%20Apprehensions%20%28FY%201925%20-
%20FY%202019%29.pdf; Graff, “Border Patrol Hits a Breaking Point.” 
155 Randy Capps et al., “From Control to Crisis: Changing Trends and Policies Reshaping U.S.-
Mexico Border Enforcement,” Migration Policy Institute, August 2, 2019, 
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/changing-trends-policies-reshaping-us-mexico-border-
enforcement. 
156 “Border Patrol History,” U.S. Customs and Border Protection, accessed May 2, 2020, 
https://www.cbp.gov/border-security/along-us-borders/history. 
157 Kelly Lytle Hernández, Migra! A History of the U.S. Border Patrol (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2010), 17. 
50 
crossers.158 These changes, along with external conditions, contributed to the BP’s current 
crisis. 
The BP’s roles and responsibilities have grown increasingly complex. In the early 
1940s, the transfer of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) from the Labor to 
the Justice Department, and World War II, expanded the BP’s role.159 Its new 
responsibilities included guarding internment camps and interdicting “Axis saboteurs.”160 
In 1952, legislation further empowered the BP, permitting agents to arrest undocumented 
entrants found anywhere within the United States. This change came in response to the 
increasing popularity of aircraft as a mode of travel.161 Thus, border patrol agents, or 
BPAs, became regulars at airports, monitoring people alongside airport security agents.  
Legislation continued to expand the BP over the years. The Immigration Reform 
and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), the Immigration Act of 1990, and IIRIRA in 1996 
significantly enlarged the BP’s workforce and technological capacity.162 From 891,147 
apprehensions in 1989 to 1,549,876 in 1996, the United States experienced a 74 percent 
increase in undocumented migrants entering at the Southwest border.163 In response, 
Congress increased BP’s personnel and facilities and overhauled the patrolling process. By 
the early 2010s, the United States reached a historical apex with over 20,000 BPAs, 
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approximately four times more than in FY 1992 (see Figure 4).164 The BP’s overall budget 
in the early 2000s was already more than 500 percent higher than in the 1980s.165 To go 
from approximately 5,000 to 20,000 BPAs, when apprehensions decreased during the same 
period (1996 to 2019) from 1,549,876 to 859,501, is unruly and irresponsible. 
 
Figure 4. Border Patrol Staffing, FY 1992–2019166 
By upgrading its technological resources, Congress also militarized the BP. In the 
late 1980s, the BP obtained infrared night-vision scopes, seismic sensors, surveillance 
systems, drones, and helicopters, among other linear technology—military-style 
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equipment similar to what is used in contemporary wars.167 BPAs used the same 
equipment in their efforts to interdict drug cartels and undocumented immigrants. In 1994, 
the BP explicitly acknowledged its modus operandi as “prevention through deterrence” in 
its Border Patrol Strategic Plan.168 According to Deborah W. Meyers of the Migration 
Policy Institute, these changes, along with the “prevention through deterrence” strategy 
toward the migrant population, resulted in “qualitative changes to functions of BP.”169 In 
other words, the BP’s approach became more militaristic. This made the BP susceptible to 
the military’s ethos, values, and rules of engagement at the Mexico-U.S. border, which is 
not a space of warfare. Militarization of BPAs at the border is a slippery slope; the border 
is already a complicated and chaotic space, and continued militarization speeds the BP’s 
descent into disorder.  
The 9/11 attacks prompted the latest structural changes to the BP. To ensure greater 
vigilance in combating fraud and terrorism, the United States consolidated several agencies 
in and around the new Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Specifically, the 
Homeland Security Act of 2002 fused the BP with the U.S. Customs Services and 
Immigration Inspection unit of the INS to create CBP.170 As a component of the newly 
established DHS, in March 2003 CBP officially became the United States’ primary border 
security institution and its largest law enforcement agency. On the one hand, its mission is 
to secure the border against terrorists, criminals, contraband, and inadmissible aliens; on 
the other hand, CBP facilitates the flow of legitimate trade and travelers.171 Its broad 
responsibilities range from verifying travel documents to seizing narcotics. The post-9/11 
administrative changes did not affect the BP’s role and responsibilities, but it 
institutionalized a hyper-focus on national security and increased interagency and 
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intergovernmental coordination and collaboration with respect to information-sharing on 
security issues.172 Bordering thus became synonymous with protecting the homeland.  
Under CBP, the BP continues to struggle with its identity. According to the CBP 
website, the BP’s is largely “detection, apprehension and/or deterrence of terrorists and 
terrorist weapons.”173 However, the BP still maintains its role in the U.S. asylum program 
as the first contact for asylum seekers. The changing demographics of the present wave of 
migrants, along with increasing numbers of border crossers and people requesting 
protection, also complicate the BP’s operations. Starting in 2007, the United States saw a 
hike in immigration from the Northern Triangle of Central America (NTCA), while the 
numbers of Mexican immigrants fell significantly.174 Since 2014, the majority of migrants 
from the NTCA have been families and unaccompanied alien children (UACs) requesting 
asylum at the U.S. Southern border, whereas Mexicans immigrants were typically single 
men.175 According to the BP, in FY 2019 more than 71 percent of its total apprehensions 
were NTCA migrants.176 Hondurans constituted almost 30 percent of all apprehensions 
from the same period, second only to Guatemalans at 31 percent; there was an increase of 
nearly 172 percent in total apprehensions of families and UACs between FY 2018 and FY 
2019 (see Figure 5). The BP’s former enforcement approach to national security, drug 
interdiction, and a migrant population no longer works to handle families and children 
needing protection; this misalignment between policy and reality results in confusion and 
stress, and has detrimental effects on both the border patrol agents and the migrants they 
encounter. 
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Figure 5. Southwest Border Apprehensions from NTCA, FY 2017–2019177 
Congress funds the BP, and since FY 1992, approximately 85 percent of all BP 
agents work in the U.S. Southwest border states, as shown in Figure 6.178 However, CBP 
secures a total of 328 land, sea, and air ports of entry (POEs) in the United States. Along 
the 3,200 km long Southwest border, CBP has nine POEs: Big Bend, Del Rio, El Centro, 
El Paso, Laredo, Rio Grande, San Diego, Tucson, and Yuma.179 The U.S. Border patrol is 
only responsible for the areas between POEs.180 This imbalance of priorities is pronounced 
considering the number of apprehensions along the Southwest border; despite media 
reports, border apprehensions are not at a historical high. In FY 2019 apprehensions had 
decreased by 49 percent from their peak in the mid-1980s (see Figure 7). 
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Figure 6. Southwest Border States181 
 
Figure 7. Total Border Apprehension, FY 1980–2019182 
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There have not been more than a million apprehension since 2004. According to Meyers, 
“despite over 500 percent growth in the Border Patrol’s budget and over 200 percent 
growth in its personnel in the two decades since IRCA’s passage, … an estimated 10.3 
million unauthorized persons now live in the United States, with annual inflows averaging 
well over half a million and perhaps as high as 600,000-700,000 per year.”183 The return 
hardly justifies the investment in resources.  
The concentration of BP agents at the Southwest border reflects Congress’s default 
reaction to enforcement: bordering, ordering, and othering. In addition to creating an 
imbalance in CBP’s priorities, it is a critical missed point. Meyers concludes that 
“economic disparities and other fundamental factors underlying illegal migration, drug 
smuggling, and the threat of terrorism have often been overlooked in favor of an 
overwhelming focus on border-area interdiction of illegal immigrants and drugs.”184 
Expanding the BP’s staffing—the number of agents nearly doubled between FY 2003 and 
FY 2019—obtaining the latest technology, and erecting barriers to separate “us” from 
“them” are also far too simple and linear responses to a complex and chaotic problem like 
migration.185 These responses also fail to tackle the immediate concern of the waves of 
families and children seeking asylum, a trend that requires strategic, tactical, and cultural 
shifts within CBP. Crossing the border to seek asylum is not illegal, but the BP treats it as 
a violation of law. Funding would be better served to build the capacity and infrastructure 
necessary for seamless asylum processing.  
CBP has low recruitment and retention rates despite aggressive hiring and high 
salary offers. Shortly after he moved into the White House in January 2017, President 
Trump issued an executive order on immigration and border security. One of the provisions 
of the order was to increase the number of border patrol agents by 5,000.186 According to 
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a January 2020 PBS Frontline investigation, after an “aggressive hiring campaign” that 
lasted more than a year and spent $60 million of its $297 million contract with the 
consulting firm, Accenture, CBP only had fifty-one new agents.187 As a result, CBP 
resorted to temporary fixes to address staff shortages.188 These measures included 
relocating hundreds of CBP officers from around the country to the Southwest border with 
little notice or recourse and requiring paid overtime and longer shifts.189 Vincent Salgado, 
a CBP officer interviewed by Quartz in 2019, revealed that he and almost all of his 
colleagues have mandatory overtime; he works up to sixteen hours a day, two to three times 
a week.190 In addition, dangerous and challenging work conditions mean that CBP has had 
poor staff retention, especially in remote locations. In his testimony before the House 
Homeland Security Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security, Border Patrol Agent 
and BP Union Vice President Jon Anfinsen revealed that the “attrition rate for Border 
Patrol agents is 6 percent, compared to 3.2 percent across all federal law enforcement 
agencies.”191 His testimony demonstrates that the management and use of the BP’s crucial 
resource, staff, are flawed. The overall situation points to pervasive systemic challenges 
and continued neglect within the agency.  
CBP, especially the BP, has struggled with the influx of asylum seekers, the 
attention to its work, and ultimately compliance with Trump administration deterrence 
policies. Stress, desensitization, and trauma experienced on the job due to the work volume; 
changing procedures; the overcrowded, unsanitary, and unhealthy conditions; and unhappy 
migrants contributes to volatile behavior among agents. The behavior—which I attribute to 
the praxis of bordering, ordering and othering—manifests in two ways: on one end of the 
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spectrum, staff members are expressing racists views and mistreating migrants; on the 
other, they are committing suicide. In July 2019, ProPublica reported that approximately 
seventy CBP agents belonged to a secret Facebook page where they expressed racist and 
misogynist views of migrants and political leaders.192 A ProPublica journalist, Ginger 
Thompson, questioned whether the page reflects the extreme opinion of a fringe group or 
the typical culture inside CBP.193 Furthermore, the agency acknowledged that between 
2007 and 2019, 115 of its staff members committed suicide.194 These unintended and 
extreme consequences remain unmitigated—and unexplored. 
C. DESERT TO ICEBOX: MARTINEZ’S PERSPECTIVE (PART II) 
Martinez spots movement on his remote surveillance system and gets out of his 
Jeep to investigate. Standing still among the creosote bushes and mesquites, he spots a 
few broken twigs—telltale signs. He walks around for a few minutes and notices a clear 
path of broken twigs toward the ridge, where the shrubs are denser. He heads back to his 
Jeep and radios Jonas to alert him of the sign cutting out by the mesa in Zone 2. He 
needs backup. 
Ten minutes later, Jonas arrives with the new kid, Silva. The three men follow the 
tracks to a rock formation. (Figure 8 illustrates common rock formations found near the 
border.)  
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Figure 8. Rock Formations on the Mexico-U.S. Border 
Martinez spots the group just a few feet away, huddled behind the limestone 
rocks. He signals to Jonas and Silva, draws his weapon, and walks around the rocks.  
“I am a U.S. Border Patrol officer. Soy un official de protecciόn fronteriza. I 
need you all to come out and put your hands up.”   
He counts nine people altogether—three adult men, one woman, two teenage boys, 
and three children between three and eight years old. They are most likely migrants. No 
flashy clothes, jewelry, or visible weapons or tattoos. But you can never assume.  
****** ****** 
When Martinez was a newbie on the job, he was in a situation similar to this one. 
Martinez and another agent approached a group of five men, one woman, and one child. 
Martinez immediately put away his gun when he saw the group, assuming that they were 
a family. But a narco was hiding among them, and he had a weapon. The narco 
immediately reached for his gun when Martinez holstered his own—and aimed. 
Martinez’s partner, Bennet, saw it. He yelled and ran to push Martinez out of the way, 
sustaining a gunshot wound. Two of the migrants and the narco fled in different 
directions, and the others huddled in fear. Although the bullet only grazed Bennet’s leg, 
Martinez never forgave himself for his mistake. A few weeks later, he encountered the 
remains of the two migrants who had fled into the desert.  
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****** ****** 
The one woman in the group covers the two younger kids with her body and 
whispers to the youngest child, who is whimpering. Martinez moves closer. He doesn’t 
lower his gun. He taps the three men and the two teenagers and tells them to get up. One 
of the teens is the first to respond, rising to face Martinez with his hands up. He is thin 
and looks about fourteen. Martinez has learned that most Central Americans look 
younger than they are, likely due to poverty and childhood malnutrition. 
In Spanish, the teen says, “Please, help us … we’ve tried going through the 
bridge. For months. We are afraid to go back.”  
Jonas and Silva line them up, search for weapons, and zip tie the adults. Jonas 
gives them each a bit of water, which they eagerly drink. They transport the group to the 
El Paso station for processing. 
At the station, they speak to any migrants over the age of fourteen individually, 
document their belongings and store them in plastic bags, and fingerprint each of them. 
The children under fourteen are not fingerprinted. They charge all the migrants with 
entry without admission or parole.  
Martinez observes Silva while he gathers basic biographical information for the 
first time. 
“They will all have the same story,” Martinez tells Silva, rolling his eyes. “Oh, 
the maras are after us. We need asylum.” They always need asylum these days. 
Silva conducts the initial sworn statements and asks each person age fourteen and 
over the following questions: Why did you leave your home country or country of last 
residence? Do you have any fear or concern about being returned to your home country 
or being removed from the United States? Would you be harmed if you are returned to 
your home country or country of last residence? Do you have any questions or is there 
anything else you would like to add? 
Three families, including a man with his teenage son, compose the group. The 
teen who spoke—his name, they find out, is Luis—is traveling alone. They separated from 
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a larger group, a caravan originating from San Pedro Sula, Honduras. They traveled 
mostly in the early mornings and evenings to avoid the hot sun and the Border Patrol. 
But their coyote left them midway, just pointed in the general direction they were 
supposed to walk. Without their coyote, they got lost and desperate. As expected, they all 
claim fear of returning to Honduras. (Figure 9 illustrates Luis’s journey from San Pedro 
Zacapa to El Paso, Texas if he walked the entire way.)  
 
Figure 9. Map of Journey from Honduras to El Paso, Texas195 
When they complete the processing, Martinez separates the male and female for 
transportation to their respective holding cells. Only children under twelve can stay with 
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their mothers in the cells. Teens also have their own cells, separated by sex. Martinez 
knows the migrants call the holding cells hieleras (which means freezers or iceboxes). 
The rooms have been crowded for months, but it is a temporary situation. He does not 
understand why they are complaining and asking to shower and for toiletries. They’re not 
running a hotel, after all. Each migrant receive a Mylar blanket to keep warm. They 
typically only stay in the hieleras for seventy-two hours or less before being transported 
to the detention facilities to wait for their credible fear interview.  
The families will travel to the South Texas segregated family detention facilities. 
Martinez feels a flash of concern for the teen who is on his own. Luis had just turned 
eighteen, and he, alone, will be heading to Cibola County Correctional Center, a county 
jail, where he will be detained with adult males.  
D. DETENTION AND DEPORTATION 
In the last three decades, the United States has practiced a policy of prevention 
through deterrence. Specifically, the BP’s National Strategic Plan of 1994 called for the 
concentration of personnel, infrastructure, and surveillance technology to focus on illegal 
entrants’ apprehension to deter them and their compatriots from future border crossing 
attempts.196 Two years later, Congress passed IIRIRA, which enacted sweeping reforms 
to the INA that impede access to asylum, including expedited removal, the credible and 
reasonable fear screening process, and mandatory detention. Deterrence as a strategy 
continued under the Trump administration using different tactics, including policies of 
metering, zero tolerance, and family separation.  
1. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 
1996 
In 1996, in response to increasing illegal entries at the Southwest border, Congress 
passed the IIRIRA, which created many of the asylum procedures and barriers in place at 
the Mexico-U.S. border today, including removal procedures for all undocumented 
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migrants.197 Specifically, the act authorized immediate deportation of foreign nationals 
without a hearing “if they have no entry documents or if they used counterfeit, altered, or 
other fraudulent or improper documents.”198 In 2004, Congress expanded the authorization 
to include removal of individuals not admitted or paroled, encountered within 100 miles of 
the Southwest border, who cannot “demonstrate that they had been present in the country 
for the 14-day period prior to apprehension.”199 These stringent technicalities impose 
significant obstacles that keep asylum seekers from the protection they need.  
Expedited removal necessitated the development of another process: initial 
screening for migrants seeking asylum. Congress created the screening to abide by the 
principle of non-refoulement—that is, the United States cannot return asylum seekers to 
their country of persecution.200 Individuals in the expedited removal process who indicate 
an intention to apply for asylum or claim fear of return to their country due to persecution 
or torture can only access a hearing with an immigration judge if they pass either a credible 
fear or a reasonable fear screening.201 The credible fear screening determines whether an 
applicant has a basis for establishing asylum eligibility in front of an immigration judge.202 
If an asylum officer (AO) finds that the applicant is not eligible, the officer will determine 
if the applicant merits withholding removal at an immigration hearing based on the 
Convention against Torture (CAT).203 If the AO makes a positive determination on either 
credible fear or CAT, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) releases the 
applicant in the United States to wait for a regular defensive hearing before an immigration 
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judge. If the result is negative and the asylum seeker does not request a judicial review of 
the determination, ICE will arrange to deport the individual back to his or her country of 
origin.204 To complicate things, reasonable fear is a different screening.  
The reasonable fear screening is a determination with a higher standard, for asylum 
seekers who have a previous removal order from the United States or subject to a final 
administrative removal order.205 Since they express a fear of returning to their country of 
origin, an AO affords them a reasonable fear screening. If they meet the higher standard of 
reasonable possibility of returning to their country of origin because of a fear of 
persecution, they may seek withholding of removal or deferred removal in immigration 
court, per CAT. If the AO makes an adverse determination—the AO did not find that the 
applicant has a reasonable possibility of establishing eligibility for asylum or withholding 
of removal based on CAT in front of an immigration judge—and the asylum seeker does 
not request a judicial review, then ICE expedites removal to the country of origin.206 These 
processes are burdensome and laden with bureaucracy. In addition to being convoluted, 
they introduce inefficiencies and significant deficiencies to the process.  
2. Trump Administration’s Policies: Metering, Zero Tolerance, Family 
Separation, and Border Patrol Agents as Asylum Officers 
The Trump administration implemented policy and procedural changes to prevent 
migrants from accessing asylum. Under U.S. law, displaced individuals can file for asylum 
at any of the nine POEs along the Mexico-U.S. border.207 However, as the New York Times 
reports, in April 2018 the Trump administration put a metering policy in place that limits 
the number of undocumented migrants allowed to request asylum at POEs each day. The 
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Obama administration first used this tactic in 2016, when Haitian asylum seekers 
overwhelmed the Tijuana POE. However, the Obama administration immediately lifted the 
temporary measure once the backlog cleared. Under the Trump administration, all asylum 
seekers fall under metering limits, even Mexicans.208 Such a broad application of a tactic 
meant to be temporary and targeted is unreasonable. 
Metering requires asylum seekers to put their names on a waiting list if the POE 
has reached its capacity for the day. By August 2019, the names on the list exceeded 
26,000, meaning that, in many cases, asylum seekers would have to wait at the border for 
months to request protection.209 Since migrants can also request asylum if interdicted by 
border patrol agents between POEs, many risk this route to avoid the long wait. However, 
crossing illegally between borders poses a significant danger because of the harsh 
environment and criminals, among other hazards. For instance, Oscar Alberto Martinez 
Ramirez and his one-year-old daughter, Valeria, drowned at the Rio Grande when they 
decided to cross illegally between POEs after being turned away from the Matamoros, 
Texas, POE.210 In addition to creating bottlenecks all along the border, the 
administration’s metering policy forced desperate migrants to take dangerous measures 
that ultimately cost them their lives.  
The few who can request asylum are transported to the closest CBP processing 
center by Office of Field Management officers and border patrol agents, where they are 
fingerprinted and processed.211 In the processing centers, migrants typically enter sex-
specific holding cells until they are transported to an ICE detention facility to undergo 
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either a credible or reasonable fear eligibility screening with an asylum officer.212 Once 
screened by an asylum office, those without criminal convictions, flight indications, or 
safety risks are released from detention facilities into the United States. The entire process 
typically takes around twenty days. Under the Trump administration’s deterrence 
programs, however, the process has become significantly longer.   
Applying a loose interpretation of illegal entry laws, past administrations have not 
criminally prosecuted undocumented border crossers. Designed for short-term processing, 
facilities became overwhelmed when a new policy, known as zero tolerance, called for 
100-percent criminal prosecution of all asylum seekers who entered the United States, 
resulting in extended detention.213 DHS announced the zero tolerance policy on April 6, 
2018, and the Department of Justice (DOJ) implemented it on May 7, 2018. The program 
mandates CBP to refer all illegal border crossers for prosecution and rapid deportation 
without exception, even those with children and those claiming asylum.214 The policy, 
coupled with a record number of Southwest border crossers and limited capacity at existing 
detention spaces, has resulted in overcrowding and a lack of the resources at detention 
facilities, which can no longer meet migrants’ basic needs. Migrants have reported that 
CBP has mistreated them and denied them showers, soaps, and other hygiene products, 
even their warm clothes.215 Zero tolerance overwhelmed the U.S. detention system and 
stretched CBP’s ability to perform its roles and responsibilities.  
The zero tolerance policy also resulted in the separation of families. Before the 
policy was implemented, USCIS required the screening process for families with children 
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and UACs to be conducted within two weeks of detention.216 This accelerated schedule 
ensures that the U.S. government fulfills its obligations under the Flores settlement, an 
agreement between the government and immigration activists in 1997 that set detention 
standards for UACs, especially for their care and treatment, the timing and terms of release, 
and facility conditions. Congress codified sections of the Flores settlement when it passed 
the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008 (TVPRA).217 The TVPRA 
exempted unaccompanied minors detained at the border from expedited removal.218 It 
affords special protection to UACs, including an AO’s initial adjudication in a non-
adversarial context, in lieu of a defensive proceeding. If an AO does not grant asylum, 
UACs can request a de novo asylum hearing before an immigration judge.219 These 
changes stand on the premise that children are a vulnerable population that requires special 
considerations.  
The government went even further to protect children who might be exploited by 
others in 2015, when the federal district courts expanded the Flores settlement to all minors 
held in detention, whether accompanied or not. Judge Gee in federal district court in 
California interpreted “unnecessary delay” as longer than twenty days.220 This parameter 
led to the release of migrant families after three weeks or less. Minors whose parents cannot 
be released along with them are treated as unaccompanied; the care of UACs is the 
responsibility of the Department of Health and Human Services’s Office of Refugee 
Resettlement (ORR).221 Although the family separation policy was at one time a last resort 
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and a rare occurrence, it became routine under the Trump administration’s zero tolerance 
policy.  
The Trump administration saw these humanitarian considerations as loopholes in 
the asylum system, and made it a priority to circumvent them. Many scholars, like Matt 
Sussis, also partially attribute the increase of families and UACs at the border to the Flores 
settlement and the TVPRA provisions. Sussis reports that “only 3.5 percent of UACs were 
ever removed, according to DHS.”222 And according to CBP records, credible fear claims 
jumped from 55,584 to 146,660 between FY 2017 and FY 2019, a 164-percent increase 
(see Figure 10).223 
 
Figure 10. Claims of Credible Fear and Apprehensions, FY 2017–2019224 
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In their essay on border enforcement, Daniel Martinez, Josiah Heyman, and Jeremy 
Slack note that behavioral adjustments, such as border crossers approaching BPAs to 
request asylum, reflect greater knowledge of asylum rules and regulations.225 Few would 
risk the dangerous journey north if they did not need to and if they were not aware of the 
possibility of relief. The increase in families and UACs at the border was likely the impetus 
for the Trump administration’s family separation policy. Writing for NBC News, Julia 
Ainsley and Jacob Soboroff report that, according to three former officials, Stephen Miller, 
President Trump’s senior adviser on immigration and one of his longest tenured and most 
trusted staff, viewed family separation as a “tool to deter more immigration.”226 The surge 
may be an unintended consequence of humanitarian considerations, but it does not discount 
the legitimacy of asylum claims. The idea that the families and UACs flee their countries 
due to persecution appears lost on Trump, Miller, and other cabinet members.  
The family separation program did not last long on paper. Attorney General Jeff 
Sessions first introduced the program on May 7, 2018, and it officially began on June 20, 
2018; it continued unofficially until October 2019.227 Until then, while adult males were 
segregated and detained apart from their families, mothers and any children under eighteen 
stayed together in one of three family residential centers, operated by ICE:  
• the South Texas Family Residential Center in Dilley, Texas 
• the Berks County Residential Center in Leesport, Pennsylvania  
• the Karnes County Residential Center in Karnes City, Texas228  
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Under the family separation policy, ICE staff held adult asylum seekers in federal jails, 
separated from their children, who were placed under the care of the ORR. The 
administration had no plans in place to reunite the families.229 Due to massive public 
protests against the measure, Trump signed an order to end the program in June 2018 and 
framed it as an unanticipated repercussion of DHS’s zero tolerance policy. For-cause 
separation can still take place for medical, law enforcement, or other purposes.230 For 
example, separation occurs if the child is not the biological or legal responsibility of the 
accompanying adult. Such for-cause separation has been used twice as often by the Trump 
administration as it was by the Obama administration. The policy considers these children 
UACs and releases them to ORR for services. Family separation continues to occur at the 
border.  
In 2019, the Trump administration implemented a pilot program that would 
significantly impact border patrol agents’ roles and responsibilities, and the asylum 
process’s integrity. Under the plan, USCIS trained approximately sixty BPAs to conduct 
credible fear screenings at the Mexico-U.S. border.231 The Trump administration has not 
made any effort to hide its rationale: according to NBC News, “Trump’s senior adviser 
Stephen Miller in particular has argued that [CBP] agents will be tougher on asylum-
seekers and will pass fewer of them on the initial screening.”232 According to research 
conducted by Heyman, Slack, and Martinez, BPAs have physically and verbally abused 
migrants, denied them due process, and exhibited racist, nativist, and anti-immigrant 
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sentiments.233 The administration’s plan is to capitalize on the anti-immigrant culture in 
CBP and its training that equates “unauthorized border crossings as violations of the 
law.”234 Heyman, Slack, and Martinez caution, “[T]he proposal to make Border Patrol 
agents asylum officers could lead to imbalanced and adversarial decision-makers, the 
opposite of what is called for in law.”235 According to the authors, the administration, once 
again, is ignoring the credible fear screening’s intent, which is to assess whether the 
applicant has a significant possibility of obtaining asylum in a hearing. The hyper-focus on 
preventing border crossers from accessing asylum also ignores the fact that BPAs and CBP 
officers are already overburdened; this additional responsibility will divert them from their 
regular assignments, to a task for which they are severely underqualified.236 Entrusting 
CBP staff with the responsibility of credible fear screenings plunges CBP and the asylum 
program further into chaos. 
Although they are depicted as protecting the United States from national security 
threats, the deterrence programs, instead, have weakened and undermined the U.S. asylum 
program. DHS and the other agencies involved were already strapped for resources and 
could not implement zero tolerance and family separation measures in a timely, organized 
fashion. Detention facilities and ORR housing became overcrowded, and staff felt 
overburdened and stressed.237 These measures also diverted resources and human capacity 
from the agencies’ main missions, which served only to compromise the missions. 
According to William Kandel of the Congressional Research Service, observers argued 
that “the policy is counterproductive because it prevents CBP from using risk-based 
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strategies to pursue the most egregious crimes, thereby making the Southwest border region 
less safe and more prone to criminal activity.”238 Kandel further reports that “[c]hild 
welfare professionals assert that family separation has the potential to cause lasting 
psychological harm for adults and especially for children.”239 They can also leave a moral 
stain on those who implemented the administration’s ill-conceived policies. Talking to 
Frontline for the documentary Targeting El Paso, Border Patrol Agent Wesley Farris said, 
“No matter what side you’re on, if it’s horrible, or if you think it’s a necessary evil … 
neither of those sides are actually having to do it. I had to separate children from their 
parents…. That was the most horrible thing I’ve ever done.”240  
E. ANALYSIS 
Martinez’s perspective demonstrates that the Southwest border, once a more fluid 
and relaxed ecosystem, is now a space of control and crisis thanks to the accumulation of 
immigration processes and procedures. Many of the policy changes introduced by the 
Trump administration—which were often unworkable and counterproductive—have 
exacerbated the situation, resulting in a breakdown of detention facilities. For instance, 
CBP implemented zero tolerance without any time to prepare. The short turnaround 
resulted in chaos within CBP operations. The administration also did not think through the 
logistics of implementing family separation. Children as young as six months old were 
separated from their families, with no assurances of sufficient and appropriate staff to care 
for them, not to mention a plan to mitigate the psychological trauma that separation inflicts 
on the families. By keeping them in detention facilities past the twenty days stipulated in 
the Flores agreement, the Trump administration overcrowded the facilities, stretched their 
resources, and overwhelmed the staff. These bordering, ordering and othering tactics turn 
the border into a place of harm for displaced individuals fleeing persecution. 
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The tactics also wrecked the border ecosystem from within and extracted a hidden 
toll on U.S. citizens, as shown through Martinez’s eyes. The immigration laws of the 1990s 
and post-9/11 required the U.S. government to institute staffing, structural, and strategic 
changes that turned U.S. Border Patrol agents into law enforcement officers militarized to 
interdict illicit drugs and illegal aliens, but also into asylum seekers’ first contact with the 
U. S. government and its people. The hyper-focus on national security and concentration 
of human capacity and resources at the Southwest border were overkill; it was not migrants 
coming, it was asylum seekers needing protection. The U.S. response was a default—a 
predetermined, mechanical action carried out without reflection on the situation and 
without consideration of international and U.S. norms. These conflicting roles strained 
agents’ abilities to perform their job well; Martinez’s voice here is critical to trace the 
inflections in the emotional landscape.  
As the number of families, unaccompanied minors, and other vulnerable people 
increased, the incongruence of these roles became more apparent, as did the stress on the 
agents. The stress, desensitization, and trauma from the daily praxis of bordering, ordering 
and othering resulted in volatile behavior. Martinez exemplifies the culture created and 
sustained among BPAs through these practices: they express racist, xenophobic, and 
nativists views. In comparison, for agents like Jonas, the internal conflict of being an 
enforcer while also being a protector in these scenarios resembles the dilemma faced by 
soldiers at war. According to David Wood, modern warfare inflicts “moral injury” on 
troops, a violation of their sense of ethics and values that results in “a trauma as real as a 
flesh wound.”241 Such moral injury may result in post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) 
and suicide. This border ecosystem, an unparalleled banality of cruelty, is what van 
Houtum and van Naerssen call “exclusionary consequences of securing and governing of 
the ‘own’ economic welfare and identity.”242 As the fictional perspectives demonstrate, 
the situation is complex and cannot be resolved simply.  
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IV. U.S. ASYLUM PROGRAM AT THE BORDER: 
THE STORY OF REFUGEE OFFICER CARLA DOMINGUEZ 
Donald Trump built his 2016 presidential campaign around border security and 
immigration issues. In speeches, campaign advertisements, and televisions appearances, he 
labeled the situation at the Southwest border a “crisis” and stoked fears of an immigrant 
“invasion.”243 When he became the forty-fifth president of the United States, his 
administration bypassed Congress and made extensive changes to the U.S. immigration 
system through executive orders, proclamations, Department of Justice rulings, and 
memorandums.244 Scholars and critics argued that the Trump administration manufactured 
the migrant “crisis,” and the real crisis is a humanitarian one that started in 2014 and was 
exacerbated by the Trump administration’s anti-immigrant policies at the Southwest 
border.245 These coercive policies have funneled down into everyday micro-level changes 
in the asylum ecosystem that have subverted international and U.S. refugee laws and 
standards, and have resulted in a loss of integrity and human capacity. USCIS employees 
have been forced to implement policies and procedures that undermine their training; the 
conundrums they face are explored in this chapter.  
Refugee Officer Carla Dominguez is a case in point. Her story introduces the 
transient community of USCIS officers who rotate in and out of the Southwest border area 
on a more or less voluntary basis. Carla served in two intervals, both three months long, at 
the Southwest border, specifically at the Cibola County Correctional Center (CCCC) in 
Milan, New Mexico. The detention facility is a medium-security prison run by a private 
company, CoreCivic, that contracts with Cibola County, the United States Marshals 
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Service, and ICE.246 Carla’s story captures a moment amid the Trump administration’s 
strong-arm tactics at the border and describes the changes she experienced while working 
at CCCC, including ad hoc USCIS measures that were implemented to triage the increasing 
asylum claims, the assaults on the integrity of the U.S. asylum program, and her feelings 
of complicity. Her subjectivity reveals an asylum program pushed to the edge of 
complexity and chaos.  
A. THE BADLANDS: CARLA’S PERSPECTIVE (PART I)  
Wade is late again. Carla fights the urge to text him as she fixes her eyes on the 
elevator doors in the hotel lobby. They still have time. From where they are—in Grants, 
New Mexico—it is only a ten-minute drive to CCCC in Milan. At CCCC, the U.S. 
government detains undocumented immigrants (whose only crime is crossing the border) 
in the same facility as local criminals and fugitives caught by Marshals. CCCC also 
houses the sole transgender unit for ICE detainees, one of the main reasons Carla chose 
the site as her detail location. While Carla believes that transgender migrants need extra 
protections and access to specialized physical and mental healthcare, the creation of the 
unit in 2017 also singled the community out for systemic discrimination and sexual 
abuse.  
She checks her watch and silently curses Wade. Wade is an immigration services 
officer from the Nebraska Service Center. Other than Carla, he is the only USCIS staff 
member staying in Grants, a town of about 9,000. There are two other officers assigned 
to CCCC, but they wisely chose to stay in Albuquerque, an hour away by car. When 
RAIO requested former asylum officers from other USCIS directorates to expand the 
Asylum Division’s capacity at the Mexico-U.S. border for fiscal year 2019, Wade quickly 
volunteered.247 After barely a week’s refresher at headquarters in Washington, DC, 
RAIO sent him to CCCC to join Carla.  
                                                 
246 “What We Do, What We Don’t Do,” CoreCivic, accessed May 14, 2020, 
https://www.corecivic.com/what-we-do-what-we-dont-do. 
247 RAIO stands for Refugee, Asylum and International Operations, a division of USCIS. 
77 
Their like-minded choice to work with CCCC was just about the only thing like-
minded about Carla and Wade. Wade served as an asylum officer, AO for short, more 
than twelve years ago, but the work has significantly changed since then. Shortly after he 
started his six-week detail, he told Carla that the transgender applicants made him 
uncomfortable. Over the years, as transgender individuals had become more comfortable 
coming out, they had also been more heavily persecuted. While Carla’s gut reaction was 
to tell Wade to pack up and go back to the Nebraska Service Center, she swallowed her 
words and told him, instead, that she would be pleased to switch any cases with him. She 
provided him with readings and additional training material from RAIO about working 
with such populations, but she suspected he threw them into the first trash bin he found.  
An older, Caucasian, cis male, Wade is ideologically similar to Carla’s father—
an immigrant from Mexico who insists on speaking only Spanish.248 Although Carla 
speaks Spanish, she and her father find it difficult to communicate for other reasons. Her 
father has never been exposed to different viewpoints about politics, gender, or race, and 
so he never understands Carla’s opinions on these topics. Even when they do agree, their 
words and their contexts are so different. They always end up arguing.  
Carla and Wade have had many disagreements, too, since they began working 
together at CCCC in April 2019. Like she has with her father, Carla has learned to avoid 
discussing politics, gender, and race with Wade. Knowing that she has only two weeks 
left in her three-month detail helps her cope with being in the middle of nowhere with 
Wade. 
Carla takes a deep breath, closes her eyes, and comforts herself with the thought 
of her time in New Mexico coming to an end. When she opens her eyes, Wade is strolling 
into the hotel dining room to enjoy his breakfast.  
****** ****** 
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Although volunteer opportunities with the Asylum Division became available for 
USCIS staff with prior asylum experience in late 2018, Carla and the rest of the Refugee 
Corps have been on loan to the Asylum Division since 2017. She had joined RAIO’s 
Refugee Corps as an officer in January 2017, the same month that President Trump 
moved into the White House. To fulfill the promises made during his campaign, the 
president signed executive orders that significantly diminished the number of refugee 
interviews scheduled. The administration also lowered the refugee ceiling, increased 
vetting procedures, and banned refugees from specific countries from even entering the 
United States. Not surprisingly, the number of refugees dwindled. Instead of the job she 
had signed up for—conducting in-person refugee interviews abroad—RAIO assigned her 
and her colleagues to the Asylum Division for random tasks. 
Many of her colleagues went on details at one of the eight asylum offices or two 
sub-offices around the country. Depending on the specific location, their assignments 
ranged from clerical work to registering applicants for their interviews to conducting 
credible and reasonable fear screenings. On rare occasions, a lucky few would conduct 
affirmation asylum interviews, depending on their training, experience, and connections. 
In Washington, DC, Carla had served as an affirmative pre-screening officer, or 
APSO, at the Arlington Asylum Office (ZAR), where she conducted credible and 
reasonable fear screenings by telephone. From her work, she knew that the media and 
politicians’ portrayal of asylum seekers as economic migrants exploiting loopholes in the 
asylum system was far from the truth. While there exists cases of outright fraud and many 
instances of embellishment, each of the applicants she screened for credible fear had a 
legitimate reason for seeking protection. Most provided detailed information about 
domestic abuse, gang extortions and threats, and even murder of family members. 
Reasonable fear screenings have a higher standard of proof and take longer. Many of the 
applicants have some criminal history and require close scrutiny and flagging of possible 
bars to asylum.  
RAIO eventually reassigned the majority of Carla’s colleagues to conduct 
screenings and tackle the so-called migrant crisis at the border. When she was offered 
the option of a detail at a border detention facility in 2018—initially only available to 
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AOs with APSO training—she was eager to see the places that sheltered asylum seekers 
and screen them face to face. Carla had a fantastic rapport with her first team at CCCC. 
They all started a three-month detail at the same time and stayed in the same hotel in 
Grants. Lauryn and Vishal were colleagues from the Refugee Corps; like Carla, they 
were doing their first three-month detail at the Southwest border. Melanie was the only 
AO, and she was from the Houston Asylum Office (ZHN)—one of the two hubs, along 
with ZAR, of the credible and reasonable fear program. Melanie knew the program 
inside out and was the acting supervisor. She was thoughtful and thorough, taking the 
time to point out places in Carla’s interview notes where additional questions may flesh 
out a potential nexus to persecution.  
They had all experienced the rigorous three-week training program at the 
Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) in Georgia. At FLETC, they learned 
about refugee laws and definitions, the principle of non-refoulement, standards of proof, 
the non-adversarial interview style, and other vital elements of their roles as 
adjudicators. The training also cultivated in-group solidarity and devotion to the mission. 
Carla felt immense pride standing next to her fellow civil servants at graduation, taking 
their oath of office to fulfill RAIO’s goals and objectives.  
Carla, Lauryn, Vishal, and Melanie became a cohesive team at CCCC and 
developed strong bonds with each other and even with detention officers, such as an 
officer named Carver. They discussed the cases, shared equipment, sought advice, and 
learned from each other. They took trips to Gallup, Albuquerque, and the surrounding 
areas on the weekends. At the end of most day, they took walks to watch the sunset over 
the volcanic rocks of El Malpais—the badlands. The walks were a way to feel liberated 
after an entire day within the detention facility’s walls. (Figure 11 depicts an evening 
near the El Malpais National Conservation Area.)  
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Figure 11. Sunset near the El Malpais National Conservation Area in New 
Mexico 
The Cibola County Correction Center is a dismal place—a prison, not a shelter. 
It is mentally challenging to go to work each morning. Carla and her colleagues must 
drive through multiple perimeter security fences ringed with barbed wire. The buildings 
are big, boxy, and beige, blending into the dirt and rocks. Inside them, Carla and her 
colleagues endure the strong, musty smell of persistent mildew, and elaborate security 
procedures. USCIS staff are at the detention facility on the aegis of ICE and considered 
outsiders. CoreCivic security waves through its own staff, but the USCIS team is 
submitted to extra scrutiny.  
Inside the buildings, the immigrants are detained in group pods, separated from 
the convicted criminals, but CCCC treats them the same. They wear prison jumpsuits and 
chains and must ask permission to do anything, even to use the toilet. They are allowed 
an hour each day in the yard for recreation.  
Even back then, the detail assignment was difficult for Carla and her colleagues. 
Asylum policies, procedures, and practices change from month to month. For instance, 
on April 6, 2018, about a week after Carla started her detail, the Trump administration 
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introduced its zero tolerance policy to deter migrants from entering the United States.249 
The policy directed the DOJ to prosecute every adult who crossed between ports of entry 
without authorization. Although the statue has always existed, the U.S. government 
generally made an exception for families with children. It only prosecuted recidivists—
those who reentered after deportation and had prior convictions. The zero tolerance 
policy focused on families who entered illegally, even if it was their first attempt. In the 
chaos and collapse of cognitive decision-making that ensued, whether it was real or 
deliberate, CBP began to separate children from their parents, claiming that it was a 
necessary consequence: under the Flores settlement agreement and other laws, children 
cannot be held in federal criminal facilities. Carla and her colleagues were flabbergasted 
at the illogic. It was unconscionable to use child protection laws to legitimize separating 
children from their families.  
It was also a logistical nightmare. The first time she screened an applicant 
separated from his children, Carla was caught off guard. There was no heads up from 
headquarters, no warning from the detention officers. The man entered the United States 
with his wife and two daughters. Typically, ICE would place his wife and children 
together in a family residential center, and the applicant in a separate, all-male facility. 
Under the family separation policy, however, CBP separates the adults from each other 
and their children. The man cried inconsolably, repeatedly asked about his wife and 
children’s whereabouts, and begged to be reunited. 
Carla had dealt with male applicants separated from their families before, but 
they were never in such a state of distress. In the past, Carla could usually track down 
their family members’ locations in their internal systems and assure them that they would 
be reunited. However, this time, although the man provided her with all the necessary 
information, she could not to locate his family. All she could do was tell him that she 
would talk to her supervisor and put a note in his file with the identifying information of 
his wife and daughters.  
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The entire screening took twice as long. In his distress, the applicant was unable 
to focus on questions about his asylum case. Carla gave him time to calm down, repeated 
her questions, and had to frequently draw his attention away from the trauma of his 
family separation to talk about the reasons he fled his country. The applicant also shared 
harrowing stories of his poor treatment at the CBP processing center and in ICE 
detention, including being told that the U.S. government had put his daughters up for 
adoption. Carla included these details in her notes and reported them to her supervisor 
immediately after the screening. In subsequent screenings, many of the applicants 
recounted the same experience.250 During those few weeks, Carla could barely sleep. 
When she did, she had nightmares of inexplicable violence and powerlessness.  
****** ****** 
Wade saunters over to Carla. “Sorry I’m late. My wife called when I was getting 
ready.” He chuckles. “Last night the boys were fighting over who’s the man of the house 
now, with me being here.”  
B. CRISIS AND RESPONSE 
The migrant crisis that the Trump administration railed against was not, in fact, “the 
crisis” as framed. Critics called the White House's characterization of the Southwest border 
situation a “manufactured crisis,” used to justify the Trump administration’s rally cry of 
restricting U.S. humanitarian programs.251 Indeed, the narrative of a migrant menace is 
contested by government records. For instance, the Trump administration claimed that 
cartels use undocumented migrants to transport drugs into the United States in between 
ports of entry. However, according to the 2018 National Drug Threats Assessment, 
traffickers typically transport drugs into the United States through ports of entry (POEs), 
                                                 
250 “Handwritten Letters from Previously Separated Moms Detained in Dilley,” Immigration Justice 
Campaign, accessed July 13, 2020, https://immigrationjustice.us/advocacy/advocacy-issues/prolonged-
detention/dilley-letters/. 
251 PBS, “Trump Says There’s a ‘Crisis.’” 
83 
and no significant changes have altered narcotrafficking patterns.252 Drug smugglers 
prefer such entries because the appearance of legality means less scrutiny from CBP and a 
lower probability of detection. In contrast, a migrant caught crossing between POEs will 
always be heavily scrutinized. This evidence refutes the White House's haphazard, 
dangerous assertion.  
Another widespread claim is that terrorists hide among asylum seekers to exploit 
the vulnerabilities at the Mexico-U.S. border. Former Secretary of DHS Kirsten Nielson 
told Democrats that CBP had apprehended approximately 3,000 special interest aliens 
(SIAs).253 However, according to DHS, “an SIA is a non-U.S. person who, based on an 
analysis of travel patterns, potentially poses a national security risk to the United States or 
its interests.”254 The agency further explained that “this didn’t mean that SIA’s are 
necessarily terrorists, but that their travel behaviors warranted further investigation.”255 
Some critics argue the United States failed to find terrorists because its counterterrorism 
programs are flawed. For instance, after studying data on the SIA smuggling network and 
its functions found in court proceedings, Todd Bensman concluded that DHS’s current 
counter-SIA response is weak and ineffective.256 No matter the state of current counter-
SIA operations, a terrorist is still unlikely to prefer asylum, which requires extensive fraud 
and national security vetting, over other means of entering the United States. For example, 
most of the 9/11 hijackers entered the United States legally. Plus, putting aside the Trump 
administration’s exaggerations, the reasonable fear numbers do indicate that some border 
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crossers—not terrorists—have some illegal activity in their background. Although public 
safety is a consideration, recidivists are clearly not the majority of border crossers, and the 
criminal activities tend to be minor and nonviolent offenses. 
As noted in the previous chapter, a comparative study of border apprehensions 
suggests there is no true migrant crisis. Total BP apprehensions are down significantly from 
their apex in the 1980s and ’90s. According to CBP, when Trump took over the White 
House in FY 2017, totally border apprehension was 310,531—a decrease of over 445 
percent since 1986.257 In FY 2019, the number jumped to 859,501; however, when 
compared to FY 1986, this number is still a 97 percent decrease. Indeed, the 
characterization of an invasion and a crisis at the border does not appear valid. 
However, overwhelming evidence does support the existence of a raging 
humanitarian crisis. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR), the world experienced unprecedented levels of people forcibly displaced by 
protracted conflicts in the last several years. UNHCR reports that as of December 2019, 
there were 79.5 million persons displaced by conflict and violence in the world; of these, 
26 million were refugees and 4.2 million were individuals seeking asylum.258 Under the 
1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol Relating to 
the Status of Refugees, the United States has a legal obligation to provide international 
protection of refugees and other displaced people globally.259 The legal obligation tasks 
the United States with a dual role: on the one hand, the United States agrees to provide 
humanitarian protection; on the other, the government must ensure that it appropriately 
secures its borders from homeland security threats. 
A surge at the Mexico-U.S. border typically triggers the U.S. government to restrict 
humanitarian benefits to asylum seekers. As noted in the previous chapter, the United 
States experienced an increase in the number of Central American families and children 
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attempting to enter the Southwest border starting in 2014. The findings indicate that this 
trend of forced displacement of families and children mirrors the prolonged periods of 
violence, political instability, and corruption that riddle the NTCA. From FY 2010 to 
FY 2017, the credible fear backlog increased more than 777 percent, from 9,000 to 
79,000.260 In FY 2018, CBP apprehended and found inadmissible 521,090 individuals at 
the Southwest border; of these, 108,780 claimed to have a fear of returning to their 
countries of origin (see Figure 12).  
Figure 12. Apprehensions and Inadmissibles Compared to Credible and 
Reasonable Fear Referrals to USCIS, FY 2014–2018261 
260 Meissner, Hipsman, and Aleinikoff, The U.S. Asylum System in Crisis, 2. 
261 Adapted from Rebecca Gambler, Immigration: Actions Needed to Strengthen USCIS’s Oversight 
and Data Quality of Credible and Reasonable Fear Screenings, GAO-20-250 (Washington, DC: 
Government Accountability Office, 2020), 13, https://www.gao.gov/assets/710/704732.pdf; U.S. Customs 
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Although the number of total apprehensions and inadmissibles has fluctuated, the 
percentage of credible and reasonable fear claims has more than doubled, from 10 percent 
in FY 2014 to 21 percent in FY 2018. This increase marks a sustained growth in the number 
of fear referrals. John Agnew contends:  
The only crisis, to which the U.S. panic was a response, has been a human 
rights crisis. Families and children seeking asylum from horrendous civil-
rights conditions in their countries of origin were criminalized and denied 
their right to asylum hearings.262  
Agnew attributes these extreme measures to the politicization of immigration in the United 
States and misunderstandings over the differences among migrants, asylum seekers, 
refugees, and other types of immigrants. Indeed, the tendency to reduce all people at the 
Mexico-U.S. border to migrants fleeing as a rational economic choice is misleading. 
Although overall humanitarian benefits requests, including affirmative asylum 
cases, have dramatically increased, USCIS’s focus has been on tackling the screening 
backlog at the border. USCIS’s immediate tactic has been to continue expanding the RAIO 
Asylum Division’s capacity to conduct border screenings. According to the Migration 
Policy Institute, the Asylum Division has approximately doubled the number of AOs, from 
272 in FY 2013 to 520 by August 2018.263 The same report shows that the asylum division 
assigned roughly 40 percent of its officers to screen asylum applicants for credible and 
reasonable fear. AOs either conduct fear screenings over the phone, from their office, or 
face to face at the Southwest border. With the nation’s attention on the border in the Trump 
era, this capacity was insufficient.  
The White House’s immigration policies lend USCIS another avenue of temporary 
human capacity and resources. Starting in 2017, the Trump administration imposed 
The term inadmissibles refer to persons who are not eligible by U.S. immigration law to enter or 
remain in the United States; in other words, they entered without a visa or legal status in the United States. 
“Southwest Border Migration FY 2019,” U.S. Customs and Border Protection, accessed July 15, 2019, 
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changes to the U.S. refugee program that successfully slashed the number of qualifying 
refugees admitted to the United States and interview-ready refugees. According to the 
Migration Policy Institute, the White House called for a 120-day moratorium on refugee 
admissions, to ostensibly review refugee-vetting procedures.264 However, it followed the 
moratorium with orders to increase security vetting and issued a travel ban on refugees 
from Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen—Muslim-majority countries. 
Finally, it dramatically reduced the number of refugees admitted to the United States year 
by year. From a ceiling of 85,000 in FY 2016, the Trump administration brought the 
number to a historic low of 18,000 in FY 2020 (see Figure 13).265 These measures left 
refugee officers with little work, given the reduced number of overseas interview 
opportunities; they also allowed USCIS to put a temporary Band-Aid on two problems. 
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Figure 13. Refugee Admissions and Resettlement Ceiling, FY 1980–2020266 
USCIS diverted a significant percentage of the Refugee Corps to serve in its 
Asylum Division. In FY 2018, more than a hundred refugee officers took temporary detail 
assignments with the Asylum Division to conduct border screenings and other tasks.267 
According to the Migration Policy Institute, this change was not a significant reach. When 
Congress signed the Refugee Act of 1980 into law, it created the asylum and refugee 
programs. When the Homeland Security Act of 2002 restructured the INA, both entities 
remained under the RAIO directorate’s umbrella. The main difference between the two 
programs is that asylum adjudicates applications filed by persons inside the United States. 
In contrast, the refugee corps determines the refugee status of applicants outside the United 
States. AOs and refugee officers receive the same basic RAIO training on core concepts, 
immigration law and history, and interviewing skills. Additionally, refugee officers all 
receive additional APSO training before conducting their first credible or reasonable fear 
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interviews. The similarity of work between refugee and asylum officers suggests that the 
transition was reasonably smooth. 
At the beginning of 2018, USCIS began offering six-week border details to 
employees with former asylum certification. RAIO received responses from employees 
with a wide range of experience and length of time away from adjudicating asylum cases. 
Many of these USCIS officers faced a significant learning curve. Once approved for a 
detail, those who left the Asylum Division more than a year prior receive a one-week 
training in Washington, DC, before embarking on their details. RAIO headquarters 
provided the same overview to these officers—from the ones who conducted asylum 
interview over a year ago to those who conducted asylum interview over ten years ago. 
Besides dealing with new procedures, different interpretations of standards of proof, and 
new forms and requirements, the former asylum officers had to face a new population of 
asylum seekers with unfamiliar claims of persecution, at times under vastly different 
country conditions than they encountered years ago.  
C. SHATTERED DREAMS: CARLA’S PERSPECTIVE (PART II)  
As they wait for the last metal gate to open, Wade turns to Carla. 
“What are your cases like today?” he asks. 
“I have a Honduran applicant…probably gang-related. From my experience, all 
Central Americans have some gang-related issues. The rest are two Cubans and a 
Guatemalan. One of the Cubans is under quarantine for the flu. I’m not looking forward 
to coordinating that interview. What are your cases like?”  
“I haven’t looked. I still need to do the security checks.”  
Walking down the hallway, Carla pokes her head into the detention officers’ 
section. “Good morning, Officer Carver. How are you? Sorry, we’re a bit late.” 
“Good morning, Ms. Dominguez. Mr. Davis,” says Detention Officer Carver, 
nodding at them. 
“Officer Carver, I am ready for my first interview,” Carla replies. “When you 
have a chance, could you please bring Gomez-Flores to my office?” 
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“Yes, I’ll get him.”  
Carver knocks on Carla’s door a minute later and brings in her first applicant of 
the day—a thin, short, nervous-looking kid with big brown eyes and dark hair. Like the 
other detainees, he is wearing an orange prison jumpsuit and has chains around his 
ankles and wrists. The chains are heavy on him. Carla notices that he has to pick them up 
to move more comfortably. Carla sees from the file that the boy, Luis, turned eighteen a 
month ago, but he looks younger. She sighs. He should not be processed as an adult 
solely because of his age—there should be a case-by-case assessment of maturity level.  
She starts the interview by making sure that Luis understands her Spanish and 
knows he can interrupt her at any point if he has a question or needs a break. She 
explains the interview’s purpose and confirms that Luis has no health or other issues that 
may affect his capacity to continue with the screening. She verifies his biographical data 
and asks about his treatment in U.S. custody and his journey to the United States. 
Finally, she starts collecting details regarding the harm he claims to have experienced in 
Honduras.  
As she listens to Luis’s testimony, Carla’s heart sinks. He does not qualify as 
having persecution under the definition of a refugee.268 His harm is typical of many 
stories of gang recruitment: some beatings, threats, and demands for money. When she 
asks if there was anything different about him that made the 18th Street gang single him 
out, he can’t provide a specific reason. He explains to Carla that the gang members go 
after most teenagers. The courts have determined that youths targeted by gangs for 
recruitment are not immutable, sufficiently particular, and socially distinct to be 
considered a particular social group, one of the protected characteristics for a claim of 
asylum according to the law. 
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Carla proceeds to ask all of her nexus questions.269 She rephrases each time to 
ensure Luis fully understands. Toward the end of the questioning, Luis tells her that the 
18th Street gang also wanted his grandmother’s house because it was a good location. 
Carla seizes on this information and asks Luis a string of follow-up questions.  
“What do you mean that it is a good location?”  
“The gang members think it is good. They want to be there.”  
“OK, but why do the gang members want to be at your grandmother’s house?” 
“I don’t know their reasons.” Luis looks confused.  
“Do other people consider it a good location?”  
“Yes.” 
“Why do other people consider it a good location?”  
“I don’t know. We are higher up on a hill and surrounded by trees.”  
“Any other reasons?” 
“I don’t know. I liked living there for those reasons. Also, it’s our house. It has 
belonged to my family for generations.”  
“Do you know of other places that the 18th Street gang wants?”  
“No.”  
“Do you know of other homes, businesses, or places that the 18th Street gang has 
taken over?”  
“Yes. The gang members have made several places their property.”  
“Do you know why they have taken over those places?”  
“No. Many are the homes of the members. Other places they take over, I think, 
because the owners were unable to pay the war tax.”  
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“Any other reasons? Anything similar about the places they have taken over?”  
“No. I don’t know. I try not to think about the 18th Street gang. Everyone tries to 
avoid them when we see them. We try not to hear anything about them because the more 
we know, the worse it is for us.”  
Carla looks at the clock. She has spent way too long on this portion of the 
interview. There might be something there, but it is clear Luis cannot explain. If the 18th 
Street gang was targeting all the people with homes in that location for some reason, 
then there might be a nexus to particular persecuted characteristic. This case would be 
different if Luis were older or had counsel. In all her interviews at CCCC, not a single 
applicant has had an attorney, though the applicants tell her they have spoken to 
representatives from pro bono law firms.  
She proceeds to the next section to determine if Luis’s case could fall under CAT 
protection. This section is also tricky. Luis and his grandmother did not go to the police 
to report the 18th Street gang. Although he is unable to put in words the reason they did 
not report the crime, Luis reveals some critical information: the police rarely came to 
their town, and when they did, the rumor was that they were visiting the gang. In his 
lifetime, Luis has never seen the police arrest any of the mareros. 
When Carla asks why the police have never arrested them despite their crimes 
and violence against the community, Luis responds that he does not know. He has heard 
rumors that the police are corrupt and sell weapons to the mareros. But Luis never saw 
with his own eyes any evidence, nor does he know anyone who saw what happened. 
Carla asks Luis if he knows of anyone who reported the mareros to the police that the 
gang members later harmed. Luis says no and repeats that he does not know what the 
police, city hall, or other municipal government representatives would do if they saw the 
mareros hurting him. He tells her that they are afraid of the mareros, too.  
Although Luis cannot fully articulate the Honduran government’s inability and 
unwillingness to protect him, Carla writes the summary as a possible CAT. She assesses 
that there is a significant possibility that Luis would be able to obtain withholding of 
removal in front of an immigration judge. She adds some country of origin information 
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on Honduras to support her finding that the Honduran government is corrupt, some 
police officers work with gang members, and that the gangs, not the municipal 
government, run the towns. Carla has gone significantly over her time for the interview. 
She is just grateful, for Luis’s sake, that the Migrant Protection Protocols program has 
not arrived at CCCC.  
Carla quickly writes up her assessment and submits it for Melanie’s review. Her 
friend has been promoted to senior asylum officer at ZHN and is now the acting 
supervisor remotely assisting the USCIS officers detailed to CCCC. To recuperate after 
each workday, Carla still takes walks to watch the sunset over El Malpais—but now 
without the friends from her first detail.  
****** ****** 
Carla hangs up the phone after finishing her last interview with the Cuban 
applicant under quarantine and starts completing the paperwork. She sees a Skype 
message from Melanie (see Figure 14).
 
Figure 14. Skype Conversation between Carla and ZHN Supervisor Melanie 
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Carla stops by Wade’s office at the end of the day. “Hey, are you ready to 
leave?” 
“Yeah, give me a second. I need to send this negative to Houston.” 
“A negative? May I see it?”  
“Yeah, it’s a Guatemalan. He’s got nothing—just some gang-related stuff.”  
“But did  you notice his name? It’s an indigenous name. I see you asked about his 
race and nationality. But from the notes, I get the sense he doesn’t understand what that 
means. You need to ask him if he has ever been harmed on account of his features, skin 
color, clothes, traditions, customs. Guatemala has a horrible history of human rights 
abuses, even a genocide against its indigenous population. We have COI to indicate that 
a renewal of repression is taking place.”  
“Oh well…too late. The write-up was due yesterday.” 
“Wade…I don’t….” Carla starts to say that Melanie would care more that he gets 
the assessment right than that he meets the deadline. But she decides to leave his office 
instead. “I’ll wait for you outside.” If she stays, she will end up in another futile 
argument with Wade—and she would be wrong.  
Carla steps into the oppressive heat and feels her lungs struggle to take in air. 
She knows it is a losing battle. Wade’s negative would never have gotten through a 
supervisor a couple of months ago. Just like her positive would never have been 
questioned. Now it is a different story.  
Carla’s friend Matteo, an asylum officer at ZAR, quit last week. He had 
volunteered for a detail at San Ysidro, California, where USCIS was using the Migrant 
Protection Protocols (MPP) program to require asylum seekers to wait in Mexico for 
their hearing with an immigration judge. At San Ysidro, the applicants have even less of 
a chance to see an immigration judge. The MPP program comes with a more likely than 
not standard, which is higher than reasonable possibility, and the harm must be on a 
protected ground. This restriction means officers cannot even consider the possibility of 
relief for the applicant under CAT. In the beginning, Matteo fought every case and 
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alerted his supervisor whenever he found program rules and procedures in violation of 
domestic and international asylum laws. After a few weeks, USCIS management’s 
unrelenting stance wore him out. He eventually stopped objecting and conducted the 
cases the way management wanted. Matteo started getting welts on his back and suffered 
from insomnia. Even after he came back from the detail, he had trouble sleeping. Matteo 
told Carla that he feels complicit in sending asylum seekers back to places of harm. 
Glancing across the yard, she sees some detainees in orange jumpsuits walking 
around the perimeters of their metal fence. She thinks of Luis, the Honduran applicant. 
CBP will deport him to Honduras if he does not request a judicial review. From there, 
maybe he can go to his grandmother’s friend in Agua Caliente—or perhaps not. Carla 
does not want to think about what will happen to him.  
She will tell her colleagues that the program has changed, that Melanie has 
changed. Melanie will blame headquarters; she already does. Carla notices that she, too, 
has been pacing around a metal fence. 
****** ****** 
Carla’s muted voice demonstrates many of the ramifications of the Trump 
administration’s deterrence measures, the compromises on the day-to-day administration 
of asylum, and the existential threat they pose to the U.S. asylum program—precisely, 
subversion of international and U.S. refugee laws and standards, and loss of integrity and 
human capacity. Her story also leads to questions about the moral ambiguity and 
compromise of those staff implementing the administration’s tactics. In the next section, 
the White House’s specific measures are placed in context to show they represent a 
systemic effort to undermine the U.S. asylum program and prevent asylum seekers from 
legally claiming protection.  
D. TRUMP ADMINISTRATION’S STRATEGIES AND TACTICS 
The legality of the White House’s actions on immigration is questionable. Since 
President Trump took office in January 2017, his administration has enacted more than 400 
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changes to immigration policies and regulations.270 The White House implemented most 
of these measures by circumventing Congress via executive order and regulatory change. 
In other words, these changes were unlikely to get the majority needed to pass Congress. 
Although many of these changes remain contested in court, the White House has actuated 
them, with devastating effects on the asylum seekers, the people who implement asylum 
policies, and the U.S. asylum program. This section focuses on the following tactics:  
• increasing the standard of proof 
• narrowing the grounds for asylum 
• implementing the MPP or Remain in Mexico program  
• forcing out career civil servants at DHS and USCIS and replacing them 
with a team in acting capacity eager to carry out the White House’s 
demands 
The Trump administration aims to reduce the number of applicants entitled to an 
immigration hearing or further review of their asylum case. Since 2016, the administration 
has made several attempts to raise the standard of proof, or degree of certainty, for credible 
fear screenings.271 Before 2017, the standard of proof for credible fear was significant 
possibility, one of the lowest standards. It typically requires a less than 10 percent chance 
that the applicant can demonstrate eligibility for asylum in immigration court.272 The 
reason for the low standard is that Congress intended the credible fear process to weed out 
the most frivolous claims from the potentially meritorious ones. As a quick screening, the 
lower standard also accommodates the difficulty that asylum seekers typically face with 
obtaining documentation to verify their claim between their flights and detentions. As 
mentioned, the low screening threshold is a safeguard against refoulement—refugees’ 
return to their country of harm.  
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The Trump administration successfully pressured USCIS to raise the credible fear 
standard and increase the barriers for asylum seekers to overcome the threshold 
circumstantially. In February 2017, USCIS announced that it had a revised training lesson 
plan on the credible fear process.273 In the new version, the language on the standard made 
it more akin to reasonable possibility—the higher standard used in reasonable fear 
screenings. Meanwhile, USCIS raised the standard of proof for identity verification from 
a reasonable degree of certainty to a preponderance of the evidence; it also introduced a 
credibility section in the assessment worksheet requiring asylum officers to conduct a full 
analysis of credibility.274 Given the circumstances in which asylum seekers leave their 
homes—often rushed and in secret—and their arduous journeys to the United States, 
expecting them to have their identity documents or the evidence to support their claims of 
persecution when they arrive in the United States is unrealistic.  
In April 2019, USCIS revised the lesson plan again to eliminate two paragraphs. 
The first removed paragraph asked asylum officers to consider trauma and cultural 
background when assessing credibility. The second asked them to recognize that applicants 
may need time to assemble the necessary evidence to prove their claims.275 In June 2020, 
DHS and DOJ proposed raising the standard for fear screenings across the board to 
reasonable possibility, including credible fear screenings and withholding and deferral of 
removal under the CAT regulations.276 Ostensibly made to streamline federal statutes and 
regulations, these changes are antithetical to the intent of the credible fear screening, 
instituted by Congress: to ensure that the United States adheres to non-refoulement.  
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The DOJ plays a crucial role in furthering the administration’s plan to restrict 
asylum eligibility. In June 2018, then Attorney General Jeff Sessions narrowed the grounds 
for asylum through Matter of A-B-.277 His decision vacated the Board of Immigration 
Appeal’s ruling on the case and overruled a related case, Matter of A-R-C-G-.278 The 
decision states that the definition of persecution of a particular social group precludes 
“private violence” like domestic or gang-related incidents.279 Sessions writes, “An alien 
may suffer threats and violence in a foreign country for any number of reasons relating to 
her social, economic, family or other personal circumstances. Yet the asylum statute does 
not provide redress for all misfortune.”280 It expressly states that “violence by 
nongovernmental actors will not qualify for asylum,” and that an application may be denied 
if the applicant can safely relocate to another part of the country.281 Given that most of the 
asylum claims made by Central Americans reference gender- or gang-related violence, this 
decision decreased the number of positive screenings. In other words, youths like Luis who 
flee gang recruitment, and domestic abuse victims, do not qualify for asylum.  
Under pressure from the White House, DHS conceived the Migrant Protection 
Protocols (MPP)—or Remain in Mexico—program to respond to the border crisis. On 
January 24, 2019, then Homeland Security Secretary Nielsen announced “an 
unprecedented action.”282 The MPP program applies to all non-Mexican inadmissible 
aliens placed in removal proceedings who would not likely face persecution or torture in 
Mexico.283 Unaccompanied children and some individuals from vulnerable populations 
may be exempted on a case-by-case review. Under MPP, USCIS sends these individuals 
to Mexico to wait for their immigration proceedings and only allows them temporary entry 
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to attend court hearings. DHS claims that MPP intends to restore a safe and orderly 
immigration process, prevents immigrants from exploiting the immigration system by 
disappearing before the court’s final decision, and reduces false claims.284 Experience 
shows, however, that the program adversely harms asylum seekers, asylum officers, and 
the U.S. asylum program.  
Most asylum seekers cannot overcome the MPP threshold of being more likely than 
not to face persecution or torture in Mexico.285 According to DHS, applicants must 
affirmatively state that they fear persecution or torture in Mexico in their fear screenings 
with an AO; then, the AO must find that it is more likely than not that the applicant will 
face persecution or torture if returned to Mexico.286 Moreover, unlike the typical due 
process asylum seekers receive in detention facilities, these immigrants generally have not 
had an opportunity to learn about the asylum proceedings, to hear from or speak with a pro 
bono representative, or know that they can appeal the decision.287 According to USCIS 
whistleblowers from USCIS, when AOs positively determine that an asylum seeker has a 
legitimate fear of waiting in Mexico, their decisions are reviewed and reversed by “political 
supervisors.”288 Therefore, very few asylum seekers receive affirmative determinations to 
avoid the MPP process.  
The Remain in Mexico program has not resolved the government’s concern over 
applicants missing their immigration hearings. According to the Transactional Records 
Access Clearinghouse (TRAC) at Syracuse University, as of June 2020, 65,499 asylum 
seekers have been sent to wait in Mexico for their hearings since the beginning of the MPP 
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program.289 Of this number, over half (31,949) did not appear for their immigration court 
hearing, and 7,718 are still awaiting their initial hearing. TRAC notes that their absence 
might be due to poor court records and systems, and immigrants’ location outside the 
United States. Numerous reports suggest that asylum seekers face harm while waiting in 
Mexico.290 Kennji Kizuka, senior researcher and policy analyst for Human Rights First, 
spent months documenting the lives of asylum seekers involved in the MPP program; he 
found that “636 reported cases of kidnapping, torture and other violent attacks on asylum 
seekers … include[ing] 138 cases of kidnapping or attempted kidnapping of children.”291 
Decisions made in absentia are almost always adverse, as the absence is considered 
abandonment. The MPP program increases the risk to asylum seekers and adds to 
bureaucracy and the asylum denial rate. 
Under these new rules, asylum officers are more prone to burnout and low morale. 
Due to the scrutiny of the process and the additional procedures, credible screenings take 
much longer. This development subverts the legislative intent of the screening—a quick 
assessment of whether the applicant has merits to obtain asylum in immigration courts.292 
Many asylum officers also feel legally and ethically compromised; they feel forced to 
implement the administration’s programs. In a report to Senator Jeff Merkley’s office, one 
whistleblower wrote of the MPP program, “Implementation of a program for which there 
is no legal authority violates my oath to office.”293 Furthermore, the burnout from working 
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long hours to put a dent in the backlog has resulted in high turnover.294 Eric Katz writes: 
“Poor morale has been exacerbated by the current administration, which has sought to limit 
legal immigration and forced employees to comply with policies they say violate federal 
and international laws.”295 High turnover and loss of human capacity compromise the 
health of the asylum program. 
Forced resignations and reassignments of top DHS and USCIS leadership have also 
been demoralizing and worrisome for staff. The Trump administration has been quick to 
jettison leadership, particularly well-established officials, in every immigration-related 
agency that disagrees with the administration’s immigration plans.296 In April 2019, 
Trump forced Kirstjen Nielsen out of her role as DHS secretary because he did not feel she 
was tough enough on immigration.297 Claire Grady, the acting deputy secretary and 
undersecretary for management, departed a few days later. By the last week in April 2019, 
at least twelve top positions were vacant, held by officials in an acting capacity.298 
Francis L. Cissena left his role as director of USCIS in May 2019, adding to the vacancies. 
In August 2020, the Government Accountability Office, an independent investigative arm 
of Congress, concluded that USCIS inaccurately applied the line of succession after the 
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Nielsen’s resignation.299 The Government Accountability Office indicated that Acting 
Homeland Security Secretary Chad Wolf and Acting Deputy Secretary Ken Cuccinelli 
should not have been eligible. A vacuum of experienced leadership and illegitimate 
leadership destabilizes, weakens, and calls into question the agency’s actions. These 
changes bring mayhem to the implementation of the chaotic changes the Trump 
administration seeks to make. 
For the rank and file in the asylum program, perhaps the most significant ousting 
was former head of the USCIS Asylum Division, John J. Lafferty, a highly regarded career 
civil servant. According to the whistleblowers, Acting Director Cuccinelli, who replaced 
Nielsen, fired Lafferty shortly after an August 2018 town hall meeting. Lafferty was known 
for evoking late Senator John McCain’s patriotism in respecting all human beings 
regardless of race, ethnicity, and other differences.300 Such a sentiment runs counter to the 
Trump administration’s nativist and anti-immigrant “America-first” immigration 
approach.301 According to whistleblowers, “Rank-and-file officers drew their own obvious 
conclusion: that Lafferty was fired for applying asylum law as written rather than skewing 
it to meet the administration’s political goals.”302 This signal is dangerous; civil servants 
serve the legal and institutional authority and not the personal or political whims of the 
administration—or they risk diluting the integrity of the agency.  
E. ANALYSIS  
Carla’s perspective offers a glimpse into the day-to-day complexity and chaos of 
the asylum program under the Trump administration. The United States, like most 
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countries, tends to respond with deterrence programs and restrictions to immigration during 
periods of national security crisis and uncertainty. In the 1990s, when the number of 
undocumented migrants at the Mexico-U.S. border soared, Congress passed IIRIRA to 
strengthen border and interior enforcement, impose barriers to asylum, and provide harsher 
penalties for violations.303 The focus on border control and security following the events 
of 9/11 continued the trend of stricter immigration policies and more xenophobic and 
nativist beliefs. When the United States experienced another surge of migrants at the 
Mexico-U.S. border beginning in 2014, Washington reacted with policies and procedural 
changes to deter asylum seekers from entering and obtaining protection. This time, 
however, the country—to say nothing of the nation—has far more at risk, and the biggest 
threat is coming from inside its borders. 
As seen through Carla’s eyes, the measures implemented by the Trump 
administration and his team of acting senior immigration reveals new meanings. As one 
USCIS staff member described, the White House's policies constitute “mismanagement 
and operational chaos as a strategy to produce horrific conditions for asylum seekers at the 
border.”304 Metering, zero tolerance, family separation, the higher standard of proof, the 
narrowing of asylum grounds, and MPP has increased case processing time, reduced the 
program’s quality and integrity, and brought some services to a near halt. While the staff 
member’s characterization above is apt, it leaves out two critical parts. Doug Rand and 
Lindsay Milliken, writing about the 2020 USCIS budget crisis, explain:  
Since 2017, USCIS has burdened its users—and its employees—with time-
consuming new hurdles, based more on ideological conviction than 
evidence of need. Thus, the whole organization became less able to handle 
backlogs or to process applications in a reasonable amount of time, which 
led to hiring more people just to tread water.305  
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Carrying out the administration’s tactics has inflicted permanent damage to the U.S. 
immigration system and shattered the morale of those who work in the immigration system, 
not to mention the dreams of those who seek refuge. 
The facts and the narratives, together, point to a situation that has alarming 
implications for homeland security. In their exploration of homeland security as a 
framework for analysis, Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde conclude, “National 
security should not be idealized. It works to silence opposition and has given power holders 
many opportunities to exploit ‘threats’ for domestic purposes, to claim a right to handle 
something with less democratic control and constraint.”306 The authors point out that 
political actors tend to exploit a crisis and corrode democratic processes and institutions to 
advance political agendas under the banner of national security. However, at a basic level, 
the authors warn that the response can be far more dangerous than the crisis itself and that 
the bigger threat may be internal.  
Although it is difficult for many to accept, the evidence is in the wreckage. In June 
2020, USCIS announced that it would furlough approximately 70 percent of its workforce 
without a $1.2 billion bailout from Congress.307 Despite an uptick in revenue making the 
furlough unnecessary, the Trump administration pushed forward, delaying the furlough 
until August 30, 2020; although the administration canceled the furlough at the last minute, 
they threatened potential furloughs in the future. According to the Migration Policy 
Institute, “the budget crisis points to policy decisions and fiscal choices that have set 
USCIS up for failure—now and over the longer term. The inevitable outcome, already 
underway, is significantly reduced levels of legal immigration.”308 Immigration is a 
primary function of a democracy. A weak immigration system makes a nation unable to 
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manage mobility, security, and global interconnectedness. Ultimately, a crippled U.S. 
immigration system undermines the U.S. national identity, values, and way of life—in 




The U.S. asylum system reflects the promise of American values—freedom, 
equality, and justice. Its transformation under the Trump administration represents a 
historically drastic rollback of the U.S. protection of vulnerable individuals. In July 2020, 
the Canadian court ruled that the United States is no longer a “safe” destination for refugees 
because of its detention and cruel treatment of asylum seekers.309 The changes have hurt 
the United States’ reputation abroad and have led to critical, structural cracks in the asylum 
program.310 The fictionalized yet realistic narratives showing Martinez’s dehumanization 
and Carla’s frustrations demonstrate how the program has lost efficacy and integrity. 
Through regulatory changes, policies, and procedures that have encumbered asylum at the 
Southwest border, the Trump administration has prevented displaced people, like Luis, 
from accessing protection, and overburdened government civil servants, some of whom are 
already morally conflicted. The administration’s tactics have crippled U.S. humanitarian 
programs and are dangerously eroding democratic values and civil liberties.  
The research presented in this thesis elucidates the value of accessing and analyzing 
subjective data, vis-à-vis the Cynefin framework, to understand complex and chaotic 
homeland security issues. Highlighting the otherwise muted voices of the transient border 
community offers new knowledge about the factors that have precipitated the humanitarian 
crisis at the border and that are crippling of the U.S. asylum program. The subjectivity of 
the displaced youth, the border patrol agent, and the refugee officer challenges mainstream 
media’s portrayal of a national security “migrant crisis” and unearths the actual crisis 
                                                 
309 Matthew S. Schwartz, “U.S.-Canada Asylum Treaty Unconstitutional, Judge Finds, Citing ‘Cruel’ 
U.S. Behavior,” NPR, July 23, 2020, https://www.npr.org/2020/07/23/894859694/u-s-canada-asylum-
treaty-unconstitutional-judge-finds-citing-cruel-u-s-behavior. 
310 Amanda Holpuch, “Amnesty Leaders Condemn US’s Remain in Mexico Policy as ‘Disgrace,’” 
Guardian, October 25, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/oct/25/amnesty-international-us-
immigration-mexico-international-disgrace; “UNHCR Deeply Concerned about New U.S. Asylum 
Restrictions,” UNHCR, July 15, 2019, https://www.unhcr.org/news/press/2019/7/5d2cdf114/unhcr-deeply-
concerned-new-asylum-restrictions.html; “UN Rights Chief ‘Appalled’ by U.S. Border Detention 
Conditions, Says Holding Migrant Children May Violate International Law,” UN, July 8, 2019, 
https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/07/1041991. 
108 
brewing underneath: the influx of families and children seeking protection, the government 
interventions that exacerbate and create border enforcement tensions, and the intentional 
dismantling and reshaping of the asylum program to reduce humanitarian benefits.  
The three muted voices also unearth the cause-effect relationships of the complex 
issues in the asylum ecosystem. Luis’s story exemplifies the struggles displaced individuals 
face in their own countries and the possibility of a better future in the United States. Luis 
faces deportation from the United States, however, because he lacks access to resources 
and the capability to articulate a technical point required by the asylum system—the nexus 
to his persecution. Luis’s livelihood hangs precariously on labels in an obdurate 
bureaucracy employed to manage migration flow rather than reflect reality. Martinez and 
his friend Jonas demonstrate unpredictable, emotional outcomes to the praxis of bordering, 
ordering and othering. Unrecognized and unmitigated, the volatile behavior causes 
irreparable harm to migrants and to agents who work at the border. Martinez’s xenophobia 
and exhaustion is likely to culminate in another scandal for the U.S. Border Patrol and 
another violent act on the borderlands. Finally, Carla will follow her friend Matteo and 
many others who left their RAIO service disillusioned. On one hand she senses the 
bureaucratic system’s inadequacy in unearthing potential “muted conditions” of 
persecution; on the other, she experiences increased layering of technicalities, processes, 
and procedures that dial up the inefficiencies in the U.S. asylum system.311 These complex, 
chaotic, interrelated issues define the flux of the border ecosystem.  
With these new realities, decision-makers must rethink, retool, and reimagine 
solutions. U.S. homeland security leaders must seek out both short- and long-term 
innovative responses to heal and strengthen the U.S. asylum program while addressing 
threats, especially those from within. An immigration overhaul in the United States is long 
overdue; with significant programs in disarray, Congress has an opportunity to seek out 
emergent and novel methods. Doing so will require a delicate balance between national 
security and humanitarianism, efficiency and integrity, and strength and humility—and it 
will depend heavily on a skilled, dedicated staff unencumbered by political gambits.  
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A. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The crisis at the border has no single, easy solution. However, the United States has 
opportunities to prevent the asylum program from falling into disorder and to restore it to 
an efficient, effective, fair, and humane state. The following eight recommendations are a 
mix of novel approaches and concrete steps that provide a roadmap for mending the asylum 
program at the border. Such actions would allow USCIS to control the flow of migrants 
and ensure the United States operates judiciously within national and international laws. 
Finally, these recommendations would remove the conditions that created many of the 
challenges that Luis, Martinez, and Carla faced.  
1. Practice Radical Subjectivity to Counter Irrational Populism 
As previously noted, the concept of muted voices expands on the subjective 
approach to amplify its humane and ethical potentials. It is radical subjectivity; as Bellavita 
clarifies, “‘radical’ in a dictionary—not a political—sense, to mean ‘root.’”312 Radical 
subjectivity can challenge irrational populist notions and the mainstream media’s portrayal 
of immigrants. In the plethora of migrant and refugee stories in the media, the people are 
depicted as either deviant invaders or passive victims reliant on first-world generosity and 
benevolence. And there are few stories from members of the border communities 
themselves, such as border patrol agents and USCIS officers.313 Although these voices 
occupy the same ecosystem, they are rarely heard together to paint a panorama of the 
asylum system. Sharing their stories alongside each other highlights the human aspects and 
breaks down the notion of the other. These narratives help people from different 
circumstances and perspectives learn about and empathize with migrants and refugees; the 
asylum system; the global interconnections; the processes of colonization, conflict, and 
displacement; and the evolving nature of homeland security as a social enterprise.  
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Hearing muted voices requires three main components, shown in Figure 14. First, 
researchers and practitioners must identify members of the ecosystem with sense data that 
cannot otherwise be attained. These are often the end users and frontline workers who have 
lived and experienced a particular system’s reality, not those on the periphery such as 
agency heads, budget specialists, and managers. Second, researchers and practitioners must 
access their unfiltered subjectivity. They must immerse themselves in the world of the 
muted voices and gain their trust by spending substantial time engaging with them. Lastly, 
researchers and practitioners must have emotional and social intelligence. As the world 
becomes increasingly automated and screens separate human beings, these skills become 
critical points of intervention. A hyper-focus on collaboration, community, and humanness 
becomes, even more, a necessity to achieve real innovation in research. 
 
Figure 15. The Three Components of Muted Voices Research 
2. Develop Novel Efforts to Confront Migration Drivers 
Migration is a global reality. As such, it needs a multilateral, international response. 
U.S. leaders must look beyond beefing up the U.S. border and deterrence; these simple 
solutions have not worked and have caused greater tension.314 Policymakers must 
prioritize resource allocation to Mexico and Northern Triangle countries. Development aid, 
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not necessarily financial aid, must be targeted to counteract the most significant migration 
drivers. According to Kathleen Newman of the Migration Policy Institute, many 
understand that “migration and development are inextricably linked” and often 
immediately conflate any solutions with cost to the United States.315 Studies indicate, 
however, that development aid that increases income and opportunities leads to increased 
migration, since extra income often facilitates the journey north.316 Thus, the United States 
must consider comprehensive, coordinated, innovative solutions outside its usual 
development toolkit. Past approaches to Central American aid have been top-down, 
directed by U.S. neoliberal priorities, and have ended up lining the pockets of the political 
and economic elite. Instead, the United States government must invest in civil society and 
strengthen democratic values and rules of law if it hopes to aid development and security 
in Central America. 
To achieve this, the United States must not use its influence to force other countries 
into its preferred solution; the country must work in a truly collaborative fashion with 
UNHCR, the NTCA, and Mexico. For instance, in December 2018, the UN adopted a 2030 
agenda for negotiating a cooperation framework for migration. The agreement lists 23 
objectives and 187 actions to help countries with the implementation.317 The United States 
should be a part of such discussions. It must empower UNHCR and partner with the NTCA 
countries to get to the roots of displacement and migration. Failure to understand how 
migration functions, its evolving nature and changing patterns, its drivers, and how it builds 
on the past will lead the United States to misidentify intervention points and miss 
opportunities. Through collaborative research and an understanding of the migration 
drivers (e.g., violence and insecurity, corruption and impunity, poverty and poor economic 
opportunities, social networks and family ties), the United States and its partners can find 
the most appropriate points of intervention to benefit of the entire region.  
                                                 
315 Newland, Migration, Development, and Global Governance, 4. 
316 Newland, 5. 
317 Newland, 2–3. 
112 
Some may argue that it is not Washington’s responsibility to mitigate the root 
causes of displacement and strengthen democracy, human rights, rules of law, 
development, and security in Central America. However, U.S. national security would 
benefit from addressing the problems in Central America. The United States will always 
be inextricably linked to Central America due to geographic proximity, globalization, and 
economic and historical interconnectedness. A stable and economically viable Central 
America is in the best interest of the United States. Writing in the 1990s about the role the 
United States played in the violence of Central America, Walter LaFeber concluded:  
Unable to deal with the products of its own system, reconcile the 
contradiction between its professed ideals and its century-old foreign 
policy, or work with other nations to resolve these dilemmas, the United 
States, from Eisenhower to Bush, has resorted to force. The result has been 
more revolution. If the future is to be different, the past must be 
confronted.318  
The research herein shows that the United States shares responsibility for creating 
many bleak conditions that fuel migration from Honduras and neighboring countries. In 
the past two decades, U.S. policies on and in Central America have changed very little.319 
From Clinton to Trump, each administration has blatantly and covertly force NTCA 
countries to bend to its will without understanding the implications. Moreover, the United 
States is the most influential country in the region and the leading consumer of the drugs 
that sustain the maras. To deal realistically with the uptick of displacement from the 
NTCA, the United States must confront its past interventions and the unintended 
consequences of its domestic and foreign policies—a regional truth and reconciliation, if 
you will. By acknowledging its geopolitical-historical role in the humanitarian crisis, the 
United States can conceive novel measures and policies that may stem the flow of migrants 
and displaced people and can work toward a different future for the region.  
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3. Create a Bipartisan Commission to Overhaul the Immigration System 
Immigration has been a hot topic in almost every election over the last two decades. 
Although it is often used as a tool for political maneuvering, legitimate problems and 
undeniable trends permeate the U.S. immigration system, including case backlogs, shifting 
migration patterns, a burgeoning undocumented population, and outdated legal 
immigration pathways. The United States would benefit from a real effort to overhaul the 
system, but Congress has been unable to agree on legislation to reform immigration; this 
failure indicates the complexity of the immigration problem in the United States.  
Congress should form an independent commission of Democrats, Republicans, 
subject matter experts, and other stakeholders to study how to retool and update the U.S. 
immigration system. The commission would conduct research, including comparisons with 
similarly situated nations, to thoroughly understand the problems and come up with a set 
of data-driven recommendations to reform the U.S. immigration system. The reforms must 
have the consensus of Congress, and be within the boundaries of the U.S. Constitution.320 
While attempts to overhaul the immigration system have failed in the past, the United 
States is at the cusp of transition.321 With a global pandemic, civil unrest, economic 
recession, a USCIS budget implosion, and calls to dismantle homeland security, there is a 
real opportunity for change in 2020 and beyond. Congress must take hold of its 
responsibilities and make the overhaul a reality.  
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4. Reverse Unreasonable Barriers to Asylum 
The U.S. immigration process at the border must honor the United States’ dual role 
of providing humanitarian protection to those eligible and maintaining national security.322 
The first step is to reverse the unreasonable and often cruel barriers imposed by the Trump 
administration that prevent asylum seekers from obtaining protection.323 The legality of 
many of the Trump administration’s 400 policy and procedural changes—made through 
executive orders and regulatory changes—is questionable.324 The tactic of bypassing 
Congress shows that the administration knew the Senate and House of Representatives 
likely would not have likely approved the measures. Furthermore, many of the measures 
were deemed unconstitutional and struck down by federal courts, deemed logistically 
impractical due to resources and other constraints, withdrawn due to public outcry, or 
resisted by local and state governments.325 Such reactions call the legitimacy and long-
term efficacy of the administration’s immigration actions into question. These changes 
have also led to low morale and high turnover in the U.S. Border Patrol and the Asylum 
Division, and instability within U.S. homeland security institutions.326 The departure of 
public career officials and experienced rank and file civil servants represents a loss of 
institutional capacity and credibility. The measures have affected, also, DHS’s ability to 
uphold its mission of providing immigration benefits to eligible applicants, securing and 
managing the U.S. borders, and preventing terrorism and fraud. Overall, the 
administration’s actions have made the United States more vulnerable to external and 
internal national security threats.  
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5. Restore the Credible Fear Process  
Created during the crafting of IIRIRA, Congress intended for the credible fear 
screening process to identify asylum seekers among those in the expedited removal 
process. The standard of proof is deliberately low because Congress conceived credible 
fear as a quick screening, not a full interview for asylum. The process aims to weed out 
frivolous or fraudulent claims and to ensure that those with meritorious claims have a full 
hearing with an immigration judge. However, since 2014, and especially during the Trump 
administration, the credible fear screening was shaped into a deterrence measure. The 
layering upon layering of bureaucratic procedures and technicalities—such as checklists, 
mandatory questions, a complicated credibility section, and an MPP component—made 
the process time-consuming and complex, essentially a full-blown affirmative asylum 
interview. This contradicts Congress’s intent. 
These tactics are shortsighted. Overlooking the root causes of migration, they do 
not prevent asylum seekers from heading north to the Mexico-U.S. border and have not 
reduced the backlog of cases. Instead, they cause delays and confusion, and waste staff’s 
time and effort in an asylum program that continues to be overwhelmed. Credible fear must 
be a “low screening standard for admission into the usual full asylum process.”327 Such a 
reversal will reduce the turnaround required to complete the screening process and move 
cases on to the next stage of the process in court. Thus, the recommendation is for the 
United States to restore credible fear back to its original intent as a quick intake for asylum 
process admission.  
Doris Meissner of the Migration Policy Institute suggests that asylum officers 
should be responsible for adjudicating positive credible fear asylum determinations.328 
This change would mean that asylum seekers with credible fear would traverse through the 
same process as those who entered the United States by flight and overstayed, making the 
pathways to protection more equitable. Meissner reasons that since asylum officers already 
conduct credible fear screenings and can build an affirmative case using the records they 
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have already established, the extra work would not be a significant burden.329 Moreover, 
she argues that there is already logistical precedence for this change; under TVPRA 
provisions, UACs encountered at the border were referred to the asylum offices for 
affirmative interviews. Instead of a defensive hearing with an immigration judge at 
immigration court, border asylum seekers can access a private, non-adversarial interview 
at the asylum office. Non-adversarial interviews are considered more effective in building 
trust, and they require fewer resources than a full hearing in immigration court.330 
Additionally, this change would free up immigration judges’ time to focus on their backlog 
of cases, motions, and appeals. These benefits outweigh the additional burden on the 
Asylum Division.  
Certain conditions are necessary for this change to take place. First, eligible 
applicants—those without criminal convictions, flight indications, or safety risk—must be 
released from detention facilities to prepare for their asylum interviews. Releasing migrants 
is not a new practice; it violates U.S. law to detain migrants for more than twenty days 
without cause.331 Releasing eligible applicants would free up resources in detention 
facilities. The Trump administration has made the argument that immigrants disappear and 
do not show up for their asylum hearings. However, the U.S. government can require 
regular check-ins and use ankle bracelets to prevent migrants from disappearing before 
their asylum interviews. Migrants must also have access to pro bono attorneys, and 
information about their rights and the U.S. immigration system, and case management. 
Many community organizations that once provided resettlement and integration services 
to refugees have already shifted their focus, given the low refugee admissions ceiling, to 
fill this gap in asylee services.332 This change would also necessitate close collaboration 
and communication among the USCIS Asylum Division, CBP, and ICE, which is already 
in place.  
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In terms of cost, legal reform, interagency cooperation, additional training 
requirements, and other factors, there are few barriers to these changes. They would reduce 
waste and overly burdensome bureaucracy, would simplify the U.S. asylum system, and 
make it easier for those involved to navigate the process. The United States would cut out 
a time-consuming, counterproductive measure that does little to make the country more 
secure, ethical, or efficient. By restoring the credible fear screening to its original form and 
changing legislation to allow asylum officers to adjudicate positive credible fear cases, the 
United States will restore the asylum program’s integrity and reduce the backlog of cases 
on the immigration court docket. 
6. Allow In-country Parole Processing for UACs with U.S. Ties 
The United States can immediately reestablish the Central American Minors 
(CAM) program for children with families stateside. Eliminated by the Trump 
administration in August 2017, CAM was an Obama-era response to the unprecedented 
number of NTCA UACs making the dangerous journey to escape harm and reunite with 
their legal-resident families in America.333 CAM was an “in-country” processing program 
that allowed at-risk children of parents lawfully present in the United States to obtain 
refugee or parolee status while waiting for their applications to be processed.334  Although 
the program had some issues, a genuine effort to revive this pathway is crucial; it would 
provide a safe and legal alternative for UACs and reduce the stress on resources at the 
Southwest border.  
Many of the elements needed to launch this program are already in place. The 
United States funds a resettlement support center in Latin America that can take on the 
responsibility of processing CAM cases.335 Many U.S. resettlement agencies have a 
presence in Latin American countries and can provide case management, information 
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dissemination, and other services to advance the program. The United States can work with 
the governments of El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Mexico to vet security risks, 
process the cases, and ensure the program’s sustainability. Best practices and lessons 
learned from the previous version of this program can ensure that this iteration succeeds. 
For instance, USCIS can adjust staffing to address complaints of a lengthy processing time 
given the particular vulnerability of the population involved.336 Many of the adjustments 
are low-hanging and easily implementable: developing plain-language brochures, 
providing regular updates on processing time, and giving UACs access to legal counsel. 
Investing in this program is in the best interest of the children as well as the United States. 
Ultimately, the reduced number of asylum seekers at the Mexico-U.S. border will relieve 
the burden and stress on the Border Patrol and the U.S. asylum system.  
7. Develop Agile and Smart Prioritization of Cases  
The United States should consider developing an agile, smart system that vets, and 
ultimately prioritizes, asylum cases. The system would scan the application for compelling 
signs of frivolous, fraudulent, or otherwise unmeritorious claims, for example, lack of 
details, inconsistencies, or altered or falsified documents. It would fast track those cases 
that are especially frivolous or meritorious to asylum officers for quick adjudication. More 
experienced asylum officers can review cases that are more difficult or complex. The 
drawback is the research, market comparison, and development needed for such a system. 
The system must be regularly tested to ensure that machine learning is free from the 
agency’s biases. Developers must also ensure that technology does not replace human 
judgment. Cases would require randomized checks to ensure equity and quality of vetting 
and prioritization. Finally, USCIS would need to ensure that it has the funding and 
technical expertise to implement such a system. With many different needs, old and new, 
vying for funding, USCIS would have to consider this option judicially and strategically. 
Technology adaptation is a significant investment of time and resources that can have 
potentially unpredictable results. Cost-benefit considerations, long-term advantages, user 
experience, and cybersecurity implications would need to be analyzed before adoption.  
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8. Reform Customs and Border Protection 
The CBP must rein in its border enforcement praxis of bordering, ordering and 
othering and realign its strategy and tactics to achieve a culture of professionalism, honor, 
and integrity. Martinez, Heyman, and Slack suggest that the CBP should revise its training 
program to include different topics that advance more nuanced and informed—and less 
aggressive—engagement with migrants.337 Moreover, border patrol agents and CBP 
officers must be held accountable for their xenophobic and abusive behavior in the field, 
at facilities, and on Facebook and other platforms. To this end, the CBP can revive the 
2010 Anti-Border Corruption Act, which was scaled back to achieve Trump’s executive 
order request for new hires.338 The act, a remedy for substantial corruption that occurred 
after a doubling in recruitment after 9/11, required a polygraph test before hiring and 
periodic random polygraph examinations.339 These actions would hold agents accountable 
for corruption, misuse of force, or other misconduct, and would help to change CBP’s toxic 
organizational culture.  
Conflicting, incongruous roles, especially among BPAs, must be eliminated. CBP 
can clarify roles by trimming inappropriate duties, such as those that should be reserved 
for the military, police, caseworkers, and USCIS adjudicators. Like their European Union 
counterpart in Frontex, CBP officers’ and agents’ interaction with migrants should be 
limited to encountering, debriefing, identifying, and fingerprinting.340 The Mexico-U.S. 
border is not a combat zone and does not require heavily armed forces to defend the 
nation’s sovereignty. Although CBP is a law enforcement entity and will work with local 
police as appropriate, its duty is to control the border, not the surrounding towns, cities, 
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and counties. Finally, CBP staff should have no role in asylum adjudications. As Heyman, 
Slack, and Martinez point out, BPAs and CBP officers are enforcers and cannot legally act 
as a judge by adjudicating credible fear screenings.341 This paring down would clarify 
CBP’s roles and responsibilities, relieve overworked and overburdened staff, and redirect 
resources appropriately.  
Finally, the CBP must acknowledge that most of its staff suffer from trauma, or 
even moral wounds, as a result of their service to the United States. But PTSD and moral 
wounds are not the same. Wood asserts that healing a moral injury requires different 
treatment, including the active “participation” of veterans, who must “find their own paths 
to cleansing and healing.” 342 It is much the same concerning BPAs: there must first be an 
acknowledgment of the difference between PTSD and moral wounds. Treating a moral 
injury as PTSD does glosses over the nuances and also the very core of the malaise—the 
weight of a guilty conscience. The CBP should ensure that employment assistance 
programs have specialists who understand the difference between trauma and moral 
injuries and can provide substantive resources to BP employees and their families.   
B. FINAL THOUGHTS 
More is at stake than just the U.S. humanitarian programs. The crippling of the 
asylum program is at once a prelude to the immigration meta-hazard in the United States 
and to something more sinister—the erosion of democratic values and norms.343 For more 
than four decades, the asylum program exemplified the nation’s strength and values, 
carried out with pride by civil servants. Today, the program is facing unprecedented 
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challenges. The gutting of the asylum program is inhumane to refugees, detrimental to  
humanity, and ultimately harmful to U.S. interests.  
The United States is drifting from its democratic ideals, and the world is witnessing 
the fall of an empire. According to Freedom House, an independent democracy watchdog 
organization based in the United States, “in recent years [U.S.] democratic institutions have 
suffered erosion, as reflected in partisan manipulation of the electoral process, bias and 
dysfunction in the criminal justice system, flawed new policies on immigration and asylum 
seekers, and growing disparities in wealth, economic opportunity, and political influence.” 
The coronavirus pandemic highlights America’s decline in military and economic 
supremacy, as well as in education, health, and well-being rankings.344 America's fixation 
on external threats has distracted its people from seeing the threat festering within its 
borders.  
Since the days following September 11, 2001, the United States has focused, some 
might argue obsessively, on homeland security and border enforcement. Much has been 
lost in the process. UN Special Rapporteur Richard Falk contends that many U.S. homeland 
security strategies and policies violate the human rights principles the United States claims 
to champion.345 The United States must restore the health of its asylum program and, by 
extension, realign its government based on checks and balances and the rule of law. It must 
commit itself to a holistic understanding of the border ecosystem’s complexities, and 
achieve meaningful actions based on thorough research and accurate analysis. 
Ruth Padel writes: “The more we study ways in which different biological entities 
organize their oddly similar journeys—whether macro or micro, cellular, ornithological, or 
human—the more insight we have into the restlessness of all life: how life needs, 
perpetually, not only to move but to change.”346 It is vital to recognize that change also 
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paves the way for learning and evolution. This thesis recreated the dynamics at the border 
between displaced individuals, the Border Patrol, and USCIS officers. It is a creative and 
critical dive into the geopolitical, historical, and economic conditions that create and 
sustain migration and its interventions. But this work is simply a beginning. Readers are 
encouraged to use the concept of muted voices and its expansion of subjectivity to explore 
homeland security and other inquiries. As Noam Chomsky explains, it is the researcher's 
responsibility to seek and speak the truth as best as possible.347 
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